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The UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules have been with us only since De-
cember 15, 1976.1 One would ordinarily expect to wait decades to test a
new set of arbitration rules. Conservative businessmen and lawyers must
be persuaded to write the new rules into their contracts. Even then, the
rules will not be invoked unless the deal goes sour. In addition, the con-
fidentiality of most arbitration proceedings means that only a small pro-
portion of the decisions interpreting the new rules will come to light.
Those of us who prefer to judge ideas in practice rather than in the abstract
expected to grow gray waiting for a practical judgment to be passed on
the UNCITRAL Rules.
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1. The United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) adopted
its Arbitration Rules on April 28, 1976. On December 15, 1976, the General Assembly of
the United Nations recommended application of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules to the
settlement of disputes arising in the context of international commercial relations. G.A.
Res. 31/98, [1977] VIII UNCITRAL Y.B. 7, reprinted in Sanders, Introduction, 11 Y.B.
COM. ARB. xi (1977). As adopted, the Rules may be found in [1976] VII UNCITRAL Y.B.
(part 1) 22, U.N. Doc. A/31/17 (1976) [hereinafter UNCITRAL RULES]. The initial draft of
the UNCITRAL Rules was prepared by the UNCITRAL Secretariat in consultation with
Professor Pieter Sanders of the Netherlands in 1974. Report of the Secretary-General:
Preliminary Draft Set of Arbitration Rules for Optional Use in Ad Hoc Arbitration Relating
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But those expectations have been entirely overturned by events. Al-
though only twelve years have passed since the adoption of the UNCI-
TRAL Rules, we already have a vast and largely public store of practical
experience with the Rules. This is because in January 1981 the govern-
ments of Iran and the United States agreed to submit billions of dollars
in claims to an Iran-United States Claims Tribunal (the Tribunal) 2 and
specified that the procedures of the Tribunal were to be governed in large
part by the UNCITRAL Rules. The governments agreed that:
Members of the Tribunal shall be appointed and the Tribunal shall conduct its
business in accordance with the arbitration rules of the United Nations Com-
mission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) except to the extent modified
to International Trade, [1975] VI UNCITRAL Y.B. (part 2) 163, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/97
(1974) [hereinafter Report Preliminary Draft]. The draft rules were placed for consideration
before the eighth session of the UNCITRAL in Geneva on April I, 1975. Report of the
UNCITRAL on the Work of Its Eighth Session: Chapter V, Annex 1 [1975] VI UNCITRAL
Y.B. (part 1) 9, 24, U.N. Doc. A/10017 (1975) [hereinafter Report Discussion Preliminary
Draft]. The daily record of the eighth session meetings is published as Examination of the
Preliminary Draft "International Commercial Arbitration Rules," U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/SR.159-
171 (1975) [hereinafter Eighth Session Recordl.
The UNCITRAL Secretariat and Professor Sanders then prepared a revised draft, taking
into account the observations made in the course of the eighth session. Report of the
Secretary-General: Revised Draft Set of Arbitration Rules for Optional Use in Ad Hoc
Arbitration Relating to International Trade (UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules) [1976] VII UN-
CITRAL Y.B. (part 2) 157, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/112 (1975); Commentary on the Draft UN-
CITRAL Arbitration Rules, id. at 166, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/II2/Add. 1 (1975) [hereinafter
together Report Revised Draft].
The UNCITRAL established a Committee of the Whole 11 to consider the revised draft
and to report back to it. Report of the Committee of the Whole 11 Relating to the UNCITRAL
Arbitration Rules, U.N. Doc. AICN.9/9/CRP. 1, reprinted in Report of the UNCITRAL on
the Work ofIts Ninth Session, [1976] VII UNCITRAL Y.B. (part 1) Annex II, U.N. Doc.
A/31/17 (1976) [hereinafter Committee of the Whole I1 Report]; Committee of the Whole H,
Ninth Session, Summary Record, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/9/C.2/SR.1-19 (1976) [hereinafter
Committee of the Whole 11 Summary]. The UNCITRAL considered the report of this
Committee and approved the final text of the Rules in April 1976. Report of the UNCITRAL
on the Work of Its Ninth Session [1976] VII UNCITRAL Y.B. (part 1) 9, 20, U.N. Doc. A/
31/17 (1976); Sanders, Commentary on UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, 11 Y.B. COM. ARB.
172 (1977) [hereinafter Sanders, Commentary].
2. The Iran-United States Claims Tribunal was established pursuant to the Declaration
of the Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria Concerning Settlement
of Claims by the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the
Islamic Republic of Iran, Jan. 19, 1981 [hereinafter Claims Settlement Declaration]. The
Claims Settlement Declaration is one of a number of agreements known as the Algiers
Accords, which led to the release of fifty-two Americans held hostage in Iran from November
4, 1979 to January 19, 1981. Besides the Claims Settlement Declaration the Algiers Accords
consist of: (i) the Declaration of the Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic
of Algeria [hereinafter General Declaration]; (ii) the Undertakings of the Government of the
United States of America and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran with Respect
to the Declaration of the Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria;
and (iii) the Escrow Agreement and related technical agreements. Iran-United States: Set-
tlement of the Hostage Crisis, Jan. 18, 1981, reprinted in I IRAN-UNITED STATES CLAIMS
TRIBUNAL REPORTS 9 (1981) [hereinafter IRAN-U.S.-C.T.R.] and in IRANIAN ASSETS LITI-
GATION REPORTER [hereinafter IALR] 2,361-74 (Feb. 6, 1981); 20 I.L.M. 223 (1981).
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by the Parties or by the Tribunal to ensure that this Agreement can be carried
out.
3
As the parties foresaw, the UNCITRAL Rules did require some mod-
ification. After all, the UNCITRAL Rules were written primarily for ar-
bitration of a single case, while the Tribunal comprised several panels
with responsibility for thousands of claims. 4 Even though the UNCITRAL
Rules were broadly written to find acceptance in countries with very
different legal and economic systems, 5 no one could expect to apply the
UNCITRAL Rules in the Tribunal without some alterations. 6
But the pecularities of the Tribunal also offer great advantages to stu-
dents of the UNCITRAL Rules. The requirement that the Rules be mod-
ified meant that practicing arbitrators who would have to live with the
results scrutinized every line of the Rules. The Tribunal took nothing for
3. Claims Settlement Declaration, supra note 2, art. 111(2).
4. Much has been written on the workings and composition of the Tribunal. See, e.g.,
Brower & Davis, The Iran- United States Claims Tribunal After Seven Years: A Retrospective
View from the Inside, 43 ARBITRATION J., Dec. 1988, at 16. Carter, The Iran-United States
Claims Tribunal: Observations on the First Year, 29 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1076 (1982); Feldman,
Implementation of the Iranian Claims Settlement Agreement-Status, Issues, and Lessons:
View From Government's Perspective, 1981 PRIVATE INVESTORS ABROAD 75; Holtzmann,
Some Lessons of the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal, 1982 PRIVATE INVESTORS ABROAD 16-1;
Jones, The Iran-United States Claims Tribunal: Private Rights and State Responsibility, 24
VA. J. INT'L L. 259 (1984); Lauterpacht, The Iran-United States Claims Tribunal-An
Assessment, 1983 PRIVATE INVESTORS ABROAD 213; Leahy, Claims Tribunal for Iranian!
American Disputes Requires Change in Litigating Style, [10] 1 LITIGATION NEWS 3 (1984);
Selby & Stewart, Practical Aspects of Arbitrating Claims Before the Iran-United States
Claims Tribunal, 18 INT'L LAW. 211 (1984); Stewart & Sherman, Developments at the Iran-
United States Claims Tribunal: 1981-1983, 24 VA. J. INT'L L. 1 (1983); Trooboff, Imple-
mentation of the Iranian Settlement Agreements-Status, Issues and Lessons: View from
the Private Sector's Perspective, 1981 PRIVATE INVESTORS ABROAD 103.
5. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 31/98, supra note 1, preamble; Sanders, Commentary, supra
note 1, at 173. The drafters of the UNCITRAL Rules took into account the New York
Convention of 1958 on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, the
Geneva Convention of 1961 (European Convention on International Commercial Arbitra-
tion), the Washington Convention of 1965 on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between
States and Nationals of the States, the Council of Europe Convention Providing a Uniform
Law on Arbitration of 1966 and the Moscow Convention of 1972 on the Settlement by
Arbitration of Disputes Arising out of Economic, Scientific and Technical Cooperation. In
addition, existing arbitration rules were taken into account. These included the Economic
Commission for Europe Rules of 1966, the Economic Commission For Asia and the Far
East Rules of 1966, the Uniform Rules of Procedure of 1974 for Arbitration in the Arbitration
Courts of CMEA [Council for Mutual Economic Assistance] Countries, the International
Chamber of Commerce Rules of 1975, the Rules of the American Arbitration Association
(AAA), the International Arbitration Association (IAA) Rules, and the Rules of the Foreign
Trade Arbitration Commission at the USSR Chamber of Commerce. See Sanders, Com-
mentary, supra note 1, at 173; Report Revised Draft, supra note 1, at 158-59.
6. The Tribunal's Provisionally Adopted Rules were promulgated on March 10, 1982,
1 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. 57, IALR 4, 291 (Feb. 19, 1982). Following a small number of very
minor changes, the Final Tribunal Rules of Procedure were adopted on May 3, 1983, 2 IRAN-
U.S. C.T.R. 405, IALR 6,306 (Apr. 1, 1983) [hereinafter TRIBUNAL RULES].
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granted, and while the Tribunal's mandate was to make only those changes
deemed necessary to conform the Rules to the Claims Settlement Dec-
laration, in fact, many of the Tribunal's changes amounted to improve-
ments or clarifications to the Rules that may have merit beyond the
Tribunal's function.
Perhaps even more important to the development of an UNCITRAL
jurisprudence is the contribution of the individual parties to the many
claims before the Tribunal. Notwithstanding execution of the Algiers Ac-
cords, 7 the two governments and their nationals remained adversaries.
As both sides aggressively pursued their positions, the applicability and
interpretation of the Rules often took on central importance. In this at-
mosphere, if a procedural question could be disputed, it was.
The result has been that in the seven years since its establishment the
Tribunal has encountered and resolved procedural issues under the UN-
CITRAL Rules that might have taken decades to arise in the normal course
of commercial arbitration. Moreover, because of the need to achieve
uniformity in handling thousands of cases, all of the Tribunal's awards
and decisions and many of its procedural orders have been published.
In short, the UNCITRAL Rules have been given an intense and highly
public workout. How did they fare? Remarkably well, in our view. The
basic test of the success of arbitral rules is whether they can establish a
workable arbitral institution and then keep the proceedings on track until
either the arbitrators issue an award or the parties agree on one. Under
that test, the Rules are a success. The Tribunal as an institution has
survived serious and unprecedented disruptions, and has produced over
400 final awards. 8
This article evaluates how the UNCITRAL Rules governing the com-
position and establishment of the arbitral institution have been applied in
the creation and operation of the Tribunal. Where the experience of the
Tribunal reveals a need for change to the UNCITRAL Rules we suggest
modifications or clarifications.
The UNCITRAL Rules governing the establishment of arbitration ap-
pear in Section I (articles 1-4), which contain certain introductory rules,
and Section II (articles 5-14), which regulate the appointment of arbitra-
tors and the composition of the arbitral tribunal. The present discussion
focuses on those sections and generally follows the organization of the
Rules. Beyond the scope of this discussion are those articles dealing with
the conduct of the arbitral proceedings (articles 15-30) and the rendering
of the award (articles 31-41).
7. See supra note 2.
8. See More than 1000 Cases Have Been Finalized at the Tribunal, 3 MEALY'S LITI-
GATION REP.-IRANIAN CLAIMS [MEALY'S] No. 19, at 7 (Nov. 7, 1988).
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I. Introductory Rules
A. SCOPE OF APPLICATION (ARTICLE 1)
Article 1 of the UNCITRAL Rules 9 provides that the Rules apply when-
ever the parties to a contract have agreed in writing that they will refer
disputes in relation to that contract to arbitration under the Rules. 0 Ar-
ticle 1 provides for modification of the Rules by written agreement of the
parties to the arbitration or in the event of conflict between the Rules and
applicable law.
The unusual nature of the Tribunal produced one minor modification
to this rule, but this change does not teach any general lesson relating to
the ordinary functioning of the UNCITRAL Rules. Article 1(1) was altered
to state that modifications to the UNCITRAL Rules may be made only
by the Full Tribunal or the two governments, and not by the arbitrating
parties as provided in the UNCITRAL Rule."l The need for such a pro-
vision results from the nature of the Algiers Accords, the agreements that
established the Tribunal. 12 This change does not suggest a need to re-
consider the original provision of the UNCITRAL Rules allowing only
the arbitrating parties, and not the arbitrators, to modify the arbitral
9. UNCITRAL RULES art. I states:
I. Where the parties to a contract have agreed in writing that disputes in
relation to that contract shall be referred to arbitration under the UNCI-
TRAL Arbitration Rules, then such disputes shall be settled in accordance
with these Rules subject to such modification as the parties may agree in
writing.
2. These Rules shall govern the arbitration except that where any of these
Rules is in conflict with a provision of the law applicable to the arbitration
from which the parties cannot derogate, that provision shall prevail.
10. While none of the private parties to the individual claims filed at the Tribunal had
contractually provided for UNCITRAL arbitration, Iran and the United States in the Algiers
Accords did. According to article II of the Claims Settlement Declaration, the Claims
Tribunal has jurisdiction over the following disputes:
1. . . . [Cilaims of nationals of the United States against Iran and claims of
nationals of Iran against the United States, and any counterclaim which
arises out of the same contract, transaction or occurrence that constitutes
the subject matter of that national's claim, if such claims and counterclaims
are outstanding on the date of [the Claims Settlement Declaration], whether
or not filed with any court, and arise out of debts, contracts (including
transactions which are the subject of letters of credit or bank guarantees),
expropriations or other measures affecting property rights, [excluding cer-
tain claims].
2. . . . [O]fficial claims of the United States and Iran against each other arising
out of contractual arrangements between them for the purchase and sale
of goods and services.
3. . . . [A]ny dispute as to the interpretation or performance of any provision
of [the General] Declaration. Claims Settlement Declaration, supra note 2,
art. II.
11. See supra note 9 (text of the rule).
12. See supra note 2.
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rules. 13 The Tribunal also added a paragraph expressly providing that the
Algiers Accords constituted an agreement in writing binding the two gov-
ernments and their nationals to arbitration under the Rules.' 4
B. COMMENCEMENT OF THE ARBITRATION (ARTICLES 2-3)
Under article 315 of the UNCITRAL Rules the arbitral proceedings
begin on the day the respondent receives the claimant's notice of arbi-
tration. Subsections (3) and (4) of article 3 specify the information to be
included in the notice, and article 2 governs the method of service. 16
13. This change reflects another consideration that recurs frequently in the Tribunal
Rules, i.e., differentiation between the governments and the arbitrating parties. Under the
UNCITRAL Rules, many rights and duties are allocated to the parties, but at the Tribunal,
the parties who agreed to arbitration and who appointed the arbitrators, i.e., the two gov-
ernments, often are not the parties appearing in a particular case. As a result it was necessary
to specify in notes to many of the Tribunal Rules which parties were meant in each context.
See, e.g, TRIBUNAL RULES, supra note 6, definitions section; id. art. 16 and its accompanying
note. This set of modifications is an accommodation of the Tribunal's peculiar structure,
with no implications for arbitrations outside the context of the Tribunal.
14. TRIBUNAL RULES, supra note 6, art. 1(3). Paragraph 2 of article I was maintained
unchanged, and it has been the subject of no particular interest at the Tribunal.
15. UNCITRAL RULES arts. 3(3) and 3(4) provide:
I. The party initiating recourse to arbitration (hereinafter called the "claim-
ant") shall give to the other party (hereinafter called the "respondent") a
notice of arbitration.
2. Arbitral proceedings shall be deemed to commence on the date on which
the notice of arbitration is received by the respondent.
3. The notice of arbitration shall include the following:
(a) A demand that the dispute be referred to arbitration;
(b) The names and addresses of the parties;
(c) A reference to the arbitration clause or separate arbitration agreement
that is invoked;
(d) A reference to the contract out of or in relation to which the dispute
arises;
(e) The general nature of the claim and an indication of the amount in-
volved, if any;
(f) The relief or remedy sought;
(g) A proposal as to the number of arbitrators (i.e., one or three), if the
parties have not previously agreed thereon;
4. The notice of arbitration may also include:
(a) The proposals for the appointments of a sole arbitrator and an ap-
pointing authority referred to in article 6 paragraph I;
(b) The notification of the appointment of an arbitrator referred to in
article 7;
(c) The statement of claim referred to in article 18.
16. UNCITRAL RULES art. 2 governs service of the notice and all other documents,
and also sets forth rules for calculating time periods:
I. For the purposes of these Rules, any notice, including a notification, com-
munication or proposal, is deemed to have been received if it is physically
delivered to the addressee or if it is delivered at his habitual residence,
place of business or mailing address, or, if none of these can be found after
making reasonable inquiry, then at the addressee's last-known residence
or place of business. Notice shall be deemed to have been received on the
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The Tribunal did away with the usual requirement of filing a separate
notice of arbitration for two reasons. First, it was the governments of the
United States and Iran, and not the arbitrating parties, that instituted the
arbitration through the Tribunal's organic documents, the Algiers Ac-
cords. Second, separate requirements were called for at the Tribunal for
filing claims and beginning proceedings in the thousands of separate cases
to be adjudicated. The Tribunal, however, provided for the inclusion in
the statement of claim of much of the information required in the notice
of arbitration by the UNCITRAL Rules. 17
A procedure similar to the Tribunal's was advocated during the drafting
of the UNCITRAL Rules. Some delegates argued that combining the
notice of arbitration and the statement of claim "would have the effect
of speeding up the arbitral proceedings."'18 UNCITRAL, however, re-
jected this proposal in favor of allowing a claimant to initiate arbitration
by simply serving a notice of arbitration without the additional information
concerning the merits of the case that is required in a statement of claim. 19
Of course, a claimant may, if he wishes to expedite the arbitration, attach
the separate statement of claim to his notice of arbitration. 20
The Tribunal's abandonment of the notice of arbitration in the Iran-
United States arbitration should not be regarded as an implicit criticism
of the UNCITRAL Rules, because that modification was due entirely to
the Tribunal's unique nature. No notice of arbitration was required to
alert Iranian or United States respondents that arbitration in the Tribunal
day it is so delivered.
2. For the purpose of calculating a period of time under these Rules, such
period shall begin to run on the day following the day when a notice,
notification, communication or proposal is received. If the last day of such
period is an official holiday or a non-business day at the residence or place
of business of the addressee, the period is extended until the first business
day which follows. Official holidays or non-business days occurring during
the running of the period of time are included in calculating the period.
The Tribunal modified article 2, paragraph I to reflect the institutional nature of Tribunal
arbitration, providing for service of all documents on the Tribunal Registry, which in turn
supplies copies to the representatives of the two governments for forwarding to the individual
arbitrating parties. This modification, which eliminates the possibility of haggles over notice
or service of documents, makes sense in the Tribunal context, but does not suggest any
modification of the UNCITRAL procedures for normal ad hoc arbitration.
17. Tribunal regulations governing statements of claim first appeared in Administrative
Directive No. 1 (July 4, 1981), reprinted in 46 Fed. Reg. 37,418 (July 20, 1981) and IALR
3,382 (July 17, 1981). These requirements were later incorporated into the TRIBUNAL RULES,
supra note 6, art. 18 which deals with statements of claim.
18. Committee of the Whole 11 Report, supra note 1, at 165.
19. UNCITRAL RULES art. 3(3).
20. UNCITRAL RULES art. 3(4)(c).
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was about to begin or to launch the process of choosing arbitrators and
establishing a framework for the proceedings. By the time the first claims
were filed, the arbitral structure was already in place. In this respect
Tribunal arbitration comes closer to institutional arbitration than to the
usual individual arbitration generally anticipated by the UNCITRAL
Rules.21
C. PRESENTATION AND ASSISTANCE (ARTICLE 4)
Article 4 of the UNCITRAL Rules 22 requires that the names and ad-
dresses of each party's representatives and assistants be communicated
in writing to the other party. The purpose of this section of the UNCITRAL
Rules was plainly stated in the official commentary on the draft rules:
"The communication of the name of the counsel or agent is necessary so
as to assure the other party that such counsel or agent possesses the
requisite authority to act on behalf of the party whom he claims to
represent." 23
Unfortunately, during the last UNCITRAL drafting session, this simple
purpose became embroiled in a dispute, first over how to demonstrate
that the representatives were authorized to act for the parties and second
over the role of nonlawyers in arbitration. 24 The rule was revised to
include the concept of a person who assists a party. This was added to
allay a fear that referring only to representatives would "be viewed as
excluding the possibility that a party be 'assisted' by a non-lawyer in the
preparation or presentation of his case." 25
These concerns led to a flurry of last-minute redrafting. As finally pro-
mulgated, the rule contains broad language that can be read as requiring
parties to list the names and addresses of everyone who assists in the
preparation of the party's case. The UNCITRAL drafters could not have
intended such an interpretation as it would lead to absurdities, requiring
disclosure of the names and addresses of translators, economists, para-
legals, secretaries, perhaps even travel agents. Discussion at the UNCI-
TRAL suggests that the identity only of legal representatives or assistants
was intended to be disclosed, the distinction being that a party's "rep-
resentative" is a person, whether lawyer or not, with power to speak for
21. See e.g., AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES
R.7(b) (Feb. 1, 1984) [hereinafter AAA RULES].
22. UNCITRAL RULES art. 4 states: "The parties may be represented or assisted by
persons of their choice. The names and addresses of such persons must be communicated
in writing to the other party; such communication must specify whether the appointment
is being made for purposes of representation or assistance."
23. Report Revised Draft, supra note 1, at 168.
24. Committee of the Whole I1 Summary, supra note I, SR.2, at 8-10.
25. Committee of Whole II Report, supra note 1, at 165.
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or bind the party, while an "assistant" is any legal adviser or legal con-
sultant lacking such power.26
The Tribunal's practice supports this interpretation. While it adopted
the UNCITRAL Rule without change, it added an interpretive note spec-
ifying that a party's "representative shall be deemed to be authorized to
act" for and bind the party for all purposes, while a party's assistants
who are not its designated representatives may not bind the party or
receive notices or documents on behalf of the party.27 The Tribunal's
interpretive note further specifies that neither a representative nor an
assistant need be licensed to practice law.28 References in article 4 to
such matters as binding parties and receiving notices, as well as the
Tribunal's note that nonlawyers are not to be excluded, makes clear the
Tribunal's interpretation that the representatives and assistants referred
to in article 4 are a party's legal advisers and not all other persons assisting
those advisers in a case. In compliance with this requirement arbitrating
parties before the Tribunal have disclosed only the names of their counsel
or others providing equivalent assistance.
This is certainly the proper interpretation of the UNCITRAL Rule. An
arbitrating party can have no legitimate interest in the identities (let alone
the addresses) of all who assist his opponent. It might even be questioned
whether an opposing party has any legitimate interest in the identity of
a legal assistant who is not a representative of a party. The arbitrators,
however, may need to know the identities of a party's entire legal counsel
regardless of capacity, for purposes of evaluating potential conflicts of
interest. Accordingly, the identities of legal representatives and assistants
should be revealed to the arbitrators as soon as they are selected. Article
4 thus should be read as requiring the identification only of those persons
whose acts and statements to the arbitrators are intended to be binding
on the parties and its other legal advisers. 29
26. See, e.g., Committee of the Whole 11 Summary, supra note 1, SR.2, at 8- 10, SR. 15,
at 4.
27. See TRIBUNAL RULES, supra note 6, art. 4, notes 2-3.
28. Id.
29. A revised article 4 expressing its apparent purpose more clearly could read as follows:
The parties may employ such legal representatives and legal assistants as they
choose. A party's legal representative shall be deemed to be authorized to act
before the arbitral tribunal on behalf of the party for all purposes of the case, and
the acts of the representative shall be binding on the party.
Persons employed by a party to give legal assistance are not deemed to be
authorized to act for or to bind the party, or to receive notices for the party. The
names and addresses of the party's legal representatives and of persons employed
to give legal assistance, if any, must be communicated in writing to the other
party and to the members of the arbitral tribunal specifying whether the appoint-
ment is made for purposes of representation or assistance. Neither a representative
nor other assistant need be licensed to practice law.
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II. Composition of the Arbitral Tribunal
Arbitration is worth as much-or as little-as the arbitrators them-
selves. 30 How arbitrators are chosen, replaced, and challenged are among
the most important issues in any set of procedural rules. Some basic
principles are obvious. Arbitration is the product of agreement. The par-
ties should be encouraged to agree on the appointment and replacement
of their own arbitrators if at all possible. If the parties cannot agree, the
decision should be made by an independent authority on whom the parties
have agreed.
But what if the parties have not agreed on such an independent au-
thority? In institutionally administered arbitrations the institution itself
serves that role. The solution adopted by UNCITRAL for noninstitutional
arbitrations was the naming of a universal designating authority, the
Secretary-General of the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague.
The role of the Secretary-General is to designate an "appointing author-
ity" to choose the arbitrators if the parties cannot agree on one. 3 1
Providing one authority to name yet another authority to name the
arbitrators is obviously a somewhat cumbersome procedure. UNCITRAL
adopted it only after lengthy consideration of the possibility of directly
naming a single world-wide appointing authority to choose the arbitra-
tors. 32 In the end, however, the two-step process was accepted as the
only practical way to guarantee that an able and authoritative person or
institution would be available if the parties could not agree on appointment
of their arbitrators. 33 The assurance that such an authority would inter-
vene, the drafters hoped, would provide the incentive for the parties to
agree, if not on their arbitrators, then at least on someone to appoint their
arbitrators.
The establishment of the Tribunal promised to test every aspect of the
rules governing the composition of arbitral panels. The strained relations
between the two countries, the appointment of one Iranian and one United
States national to each of three arbitral panels, the size of the docket,
and the probable length of the proceedings all guaranteed numerous ar-
guments over how arbitrators should be appointed, challenged, and re-
placed. This expectation has been fulfilled. Over the past seven years,
30. See Glossner, Sociological Aspects of International Commercial Arbitration, in THE
ART OF ARBITRATION, ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 143-44 (1982); Eisemann,
The Partisan Arbitrator, in INTERNATIONAL SEMINAR ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 37
(1968).
31. UNCITRAL RULES arts. 6(2), 7(2)(b), (3); see infra notes 42 & 45 (text of rules).
32. Eighth Session Record, supra note 1, SR.163, at 134-39; Committee of the Whole
I1 Summary, supra note 1, SR.3 at 6-10; SR.4 at 4-7.
33. Committee of the Whole 11 Report, supra note 1, at 168.
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twenty-three arbitrators have served on the nine-member Tribunal and
the resulting appointments, resignations, and challenges have greatly tested
the Rules. 34
The UNCITRAL Rules have responded admirably. Almost no changes
were required to adapt the rules governing composition of a Tribunal to
the Claims Settlement Declaration. And the prospect of intervention by
an appointing authority has indeed produced some degree of agreement
between Iran and the United States. Of the nine "third country" arbitra-
tors so far appointed to the Tribunal, only two had to be named by an.
appointing authority. 35 With that said, the intense focus on this part of
the UNCITRAL Rules has exposed some ambiguities and omissions that
prevent the Rules from working as smoothly as one might wish.
A. NUMBER OF ARBITRATORS (ARTICLE 5)
The UNCITRAL Rules give the parties only two choices, either one
arbitrator or three. Article 5 provides that if the parties cannot agree "on
the number of arbitrators (i.e., one or three)," the Arbitral Tribunal is
automatically composed of three arbitrators. 36
A panel of three arbitrators is an accepted practice in international
arbitration, and under the UNCITRAL Rules is the default composition
that applies if the parties do not agree to only one arbitrator. 37 Single-
arbitrator proceedings are also common and are usually less expensive.
On the other hand, as the nine-member Iran-United States Claims Tribunal
itself demonstrates, arbitral panels even larger than three do occur from
time to time. 38 Indeed, arbitral panels of more than three members have
34. See infra Part III.
35. See infra note 76 and accompanying text.
36. UNCITRAL RULES art. 5 states:
If the parties have not previously agreed on the number of arbitrators (i.e., one
or three), and if within 15 days after the receipt by the respondent of the notice
of arbitration the parties have not agreed that there shall be only one arbitrator,
three arbitrators shall be appointed.
37. Id. See Sanders, Commentary, supra note 1, at 184.
38. Presidential Order No. 1 (Oct. 19, 1981), 1 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. 95, IALR 3,809 (Nov.
6, 1981). See TRIBUNAL RULES, supra note 6, art. 5. The Claims Settlement Declaration,
supra note 2, art. 1II, provides that the Tribunal will consist of nine members or such larger
multiple of three as Iran and the United States may agree. Even after the appointment of
the nine members, the United States and Iran entertained the idea of appointing as many
as 30 members. See Full Arbitration Tribunal Will Hold First Session July 1, IALR 3,119
(June 19, 1981).
The Tribunal has three Chambers. Each Chamber is composed of an arbitrator appointed
by Iran, an arbitrator appointed by the United States and a presiding arbitrator appointed
by the other party-appointed arbitrators or an appointing authority. The third arbitrators
have, as a practical matter, always been nationals of third countries, and are thus commonly
referred to as "third-country" arbitrators, although nothing in the Rules or the Algiers
Accords requires their nationality to differ from the parties. Claims Settlement Declaration,
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a distinguished history going back at least as far as the Alabama Claims
arbitration.39
Although article 5 of the UNCITRAL Rules specifically gives parties
the option of only "one or three" arbitrators, in a special situation, such
as a dispute between States like the one giving rise to the present Tribunal,
the parties are free to modify the rule to provide for a different number
of arbitrators if they so desire.4 0 If a different number is chosen, however,
corresponding changes may have to be made in other articles of the Rules
on the appointment of members. 4'
B. APPOINTMENT OF ARBITRATORS (ARTICLES 6-8)
1. Appointment by Agreement of the Parties
In an ideal case, the parties will choose the arbitrators without resort
to an appointing authority. The UNCITRAL Rules provide fairly straight-
forward procedures for such appointments.
Article 6(1) provides that when the Tribunal is composed of one arbi-
trator, either party may propose to the other (I) the names of one or more
persons to serve as the sole arbitrator, and (2) the names of one or more
institutions or persons to serve as appointing authority, if no appointing
authority has yet been agreed upon. 42 The parties have thirty days after
supra note 2, art. III(1). See infra note 163. Most cases are handled by the Chambers, but
where a case pending before a Chamber raises an important issue, or when the resolution
of an issue might result in inconsistent decisions or awards by the Tribunal, the Chamber
may relinquish jurisdiction in favor of the plenary Tribunal. A Chamber must relinquish
jurisdiction in favor of the Full Tribunal when a majority for a decision or an award cannot
be found within the Chamber. Presidential Order No. I, supra note 28; Presidential Order
No. 8 (Mar. 24, 1982), 1 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. 97. Only the Full Tribunal has jurisdiction over
interpretive disputes in relation to the General Declaration and the Claims Settlement Dec-
laration. Id.
39. The Alabama Claims arbitration took place in 1871-72 before a five-member tribunal;
two members were appointed by the disputing countries, the United States and the United
Kingdom, while the remainder were appointed by the heads of state of Italy, Switzerland,
and Brazil. See J. SIMPSON & H. Fox, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 8 (1959). Similarly,
the recent arbitration between Egypt and Israel over the international boundary at Taba had
a five-member tribunal: one member from each party and three other arbitrators from
Sweden, Switzerland, and France. See Israel Ordered to Return Taba Strip to Egypt, 3
MEALY'S No. 10, at 3 (Oct. 1988); Summary of the Award of the Egypt-Israel Arbitration
Tribunal (Sept. 29, 1988), reprinted in id. § A.
40. UNCITRAL RULES art. 1(l) (permitting modification to any provision of the Rules
by agreement of the parties).
41. See UNCITRAL RULES arts. 6-7, which deal only with one (art. 6) or three (art.
7) members. On the other hand, if, as at the Tribunal, a larger arbitral panel consists of
multiples of three, no corresponding changes may be necessary, as the present Rules may
adequately be applied, mutatis mutandis. See Claims Settlement Declaration, supra note
2, art. 111(2).
42. UNCITRAL RULES art. 6 states:
I. If a sole arbitrator is to be appointed, either party may propose to the other:
(a) The names of one or more persons, one of whom would serve as the
sole arbitrator;
and
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the receipt of the proposal to reach agreement upon the sole arbitrator,
or an appointing authority, or both. If they fail to agree on the sole ar-
bitrator, article 6(2) provides that the appointing authority will make the
choice. 43 If the parties also fail to agree on the appointing authority the
Secretary-General of the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague,
as designating authority, will choose an appointing authority to name the
arbitrator.44
When the panel is composed of three arbitrators, article 7(1) provides
that each party is to appoint one arbitrator.45 Appointment of the first
arbitrator starts the running of a thirty-day period during which the op-
posing party must also name an arbitrator. If that party fails to do so, the
appointing authority will appoint the second arbitrator. However the two
party-appointed arbitrators are chosen, they have thirty days after the
appointment of the second arbitrator to agree on the choice of a third
arbitrator, who also fills the position of presiding arbitrator. If they fail
(b) If no appointing authority has been agreed upon by the parties, the
name or names of one or more institutions or persons, one of whom
would serve as appointing authority.
2. If within 30 days after receipt by a party of a proposal made in accordance
with paragraph I the parties have not reached agreement on the choice of
a sole arbitrator, the sole arbitrator shall be appointed by the appointing
authority agreed upon by the parties. If no appointing authority has been
agreed upon by the parties, or if the appointing authority agreed upon
refuses to act or fails to appoint the arbitrator within 60 days of the receipt
of a party's request therefor, either party may request the Secretary-Gen-




45. Id. art. 7 states:
1. If three arbitrators are to be appointed, each party shall appoint one ar-
bitrator. The two arbitrators thus appointed shall choose the third arbitrator
who will act as the presiding arbitrator of the tribunal.
2. If within 30 days after the receipt of a party's notification of the appointment
of an arbitrator the other party has not notified the first party of the arbi-
trator he has appointed:
(a) The first party may request the appointing authority previously des-
ignated by the parties to appoint the second arbitrator; or
(b) If no such authority has been previously designated by the parties, or
if the appointing authority previously designated refuses to act or fails
to appoint the arbitrator within thirty days after receipt of a party's
request therefor, the first party may request the Secretary-General of
the Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague to designate the
appointing authority. The first party may then request the appointing
authority so designated to appoint the second arbitrator. In either case,
the appointing authority may exercise its discretion in appointing the
arbitrator.
3. If within 30 days after the appointment of the second arbitrator the two
arbitrators have not agreed on the choice of the presiding arbitrator, the
presiding arbitrator shall be appointed by an appointing authority in the
same way as a sole arbitrator would be appointed under article 6.
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to agree, the appointing authority appoints the presiding arbitrator upon
the request of either party.46
The Tribunal's experience with these rules, which it adopted without
modification, demonstrates the importance of the appointing authority in
encouraging agreement. The first group of "third-country" arbitrators,
for example, was chosen by agreement among the United States and the
Iranian arbitrators, but only after the United States had asked for the
designation of an appointing authority on the grounds that the talks were
deadlocked. 47 That pattern has been repeated subsequently, including the
most recent selection of two new chairmen for Chambers One and Three.
After two months of discussion between the two governments had proved
fruitless, the United States asked Chief Justice Moons to name the new
arbitrators. The parties continued, nevertheless, to attempt agreement,
and two months later, just before the deadline, by which date Chief Justice
Moons had promised to make his selection, the parties reached agreement,
selecting Professor Gaetano Arangio-Ruiz of Italy and Professor Bengt
Broms of Finland.48
2. Appointment by the Appointing Authority
The need for an appointing authority can arise at many points during
the course of an arbitration. In a single-arbitrator proceeding it may occur
as soon as the parties try to pick the arbitrator. In a three-arbitrator
proceeding, it may occur if the respondent refuses to name the second
arbitrator or if no agreement can be reached on the third. Or it may arise
out of the appointing authority's additional function as judge of challenges
to arbitrators.
An appointing authority was first designated for the Tribunal when Iran
challenged Judge Nils Mang~ird, a former Swedish court of appeals judge
serving as chairman of Chamber Three. 49 Within two weeks of the chal-
lenge, the Secretary-General of the Permanent Court of Arbitration named
Chief Justice Ch. M.J.A. Moons of the Netherlands Supreme Court as
appointing authority.50 The designation of an individual as appointing
authority seemed perfectly sensible in the context of the Tribunal, and
46. Id. art. 7(1), (3). On the procedure for naming the appointing authority in such a
case, see infra text accompanying notes 99-101.
47. Feldman, supra note 4, at 86. See generally Full Arbitration Tribunal Will Hold First
Session July 1, IALR 3,118 (June 19, 1981); Selby & Stewart, supra note 4, at 213; 1983
IRAN-U.S. CLAIMS TRIBUNAL ANN. REP. 2.
48. New Arbitrators Agreed Upon at 11th Hour, 3 MEALY'S, Special Bull. (Nov. 11,
1988).
49. For further discussion of this challenge, see infra text accompanying notes 206-12.
50. See Re Judge N. MangArd, I IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. 509 (1982); Iranian Quits Tribunal
to Protest Mangard's Refusal to Resign, IALR 4,234-35 (Feb. 19, 1982).
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nothing in the UNCITRAL Rules prohibited such a designation. Indeed,
the rules were written broadly to permit such a designation. 5' Nonethe-
less, permitting individuals as opposed to institutions to serve in this
capacity was a controversial point during the UNCITRAL drafting pro-
cess, 52 and the drafters of the UNCITRAL Rules expected that most
appointing authorities would be institutions, not individuals. 53
The naming of Justice Moons as appointing authority is notable for the
speed with which he was named, only two weeks after the challenge, and
just five days after the United States requested the, Secretary-General to
name an appointing authority. Such expedition is by no means assured
under the UNCITRAL Rules, which establish a complex and variable set
of rules controlling when one party may end discussions with the other
side and ask the Secretary-General to designate an appointing authority.
Because the other rules on use of an appointing authority refer back to
article 6, the rule for appointing a sole arbitrator, that is where we begin.
51. Article 6(1)(b) permits either party to nominate "one or more institutions or persons"
as appointing authority. See also Committee of the Whole 1 Report, supra note 1, at 168.
52. Indeed, Chief Justice Moons's appointment gave rise to some confusion on this
point. Upon his retirement in 1987 from the Netherlands Supreme Court, there was some
question whether Chief Justice Moons would continue to be the Tribunal's appointing
authority after his retirement or whether the responsibility would be transferred automat-
ically to his successor as Chief Justice. Ultimately it was confirmed that the appointing
authority was Chief Justice Moons personally and not the Netherlands Chief Justice.
53. The debate in the Committee of the Whole ran as follows:
30. Mr. HOLTZMANN (United States of America) said that in paragraph I(b) the
words "or persons" had been put in brackets since the drafting group had been
divided on whether it was better to specify that the appointing authority would
be an institution rather than a person or to take a more flexible approach. Several
members of the drafting group had considered that there were great advantages
in providing that only institutions should be able to act as appointing authorities,
for the sake of continuity and expertise; others had thought it preferable to provide
for the possibility of a person acting as an appointing authority. Those who held
the first view had pointed ouCthat article I made a general provision for such
modification as the parties might agree.
31. Mr. ROEHRICH (France) said his delegation felt that the Committee should
leave open the possibility of persons acting as appointing authorities and should
therefore remove the brackets in paragraph I(b).
32. Mr. ST JOHN (Australia) supported that view. Although in many cases in-
stitutions might be best suited to be appointing authorities, the possibility of a
person acting as an appointing authority should not be excluded.
33. Mr. SZASZ (Hungary) also considered that the brackets should be removed.
34. The CHAIRMAN said that there seemed to be a majority in favor of removing
the brackets.
35. Mr. STRAUS (Observer for the International Council for Commercial Arbi-
tration and the Inter-American Commercial Arbitration Commission) recalled that,
when the Committee had discussed articles 33 and 34, some representatives had
expressed reservations as to whether some of the tasks specified there could be
carried out by persons.
Committee of the Whole 11 Summary, supra note I, SR.15, at 4-5.
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a. Appointment of a Sole Arbitrator
Article 6 provides that the process of naming a single arbitrator begins
when one party proposes one or more names to the other.54 At the same
time, the party may propose to the other the name of an appointing
authority, assuming none has been previously agreed upon. 55 The ap-
pointing authority plays the back-up role ordinarily played by the arbitral
institution in cases arbitrated under their rules, 56 principally by choosing
the arbitrator if the parties cannot agree. And, as discussed earlier, if the
parties cannot even agree on an appointing authority, the Secretary-
General of the Permanent Court of Arbitration chooses the authority.57
Parties who deadlock on the choice of an arbitrator are given no extra
time to choose an appointing authority. If no agreement is reached on an
arbitrator within thirty days after the first party proposes names of pos-
sible arbitrators to the other, either party may ask the Secretary-General
to name an appointing authority to choose the arbitrator.58 Early drafts
of the rules offered a separate period for discussion and possible agree-
ment on an appointing authority.59 But UNCITRAL ultimately merged
the two periods into a single thirty-day period in order to simplify and
accelerate the appointment process.
UNCITRAL did not intend, however, to abolish the opportunity for
agreement on the choice of an appointing authority.60 Instead, parties are
expected to discuss both possible arbitrators and possible appointing au-
thorities during the thirty-day agreement period. In fact, one expert on
the UNCITRAL Rules contends that the thirty days do not begin to run
until one party proposes both an arbitrator and an appointing authority. 6 1
54. UNCITRAL RULES art. 6(l).
55. Id.
56. See, e.g., Gerald Aksen, A Practical Guide to International Arbitration, 1975 PRI-
VArE INVESTORS ABROAD 51, 62; see also, AAA RULES, supra note 21, R. 12-14.
57. See supra text accompanying note 31.
58. UNCITRAL RULES art. 6(1).
59. Report Preliminary Draft, supra note 1, at 168; Report Revised Draft, supra note
I, at 161.
60. Committee of the Whole 11 Report, supra note 1, at 167.
61. Sanders, supra note I, at 182. Whether Professor Sanders is right in this regard is
open to question. While the text of article 6 favors his reading, it does not compel it. The
travaux pr~paratoires, in contrast, seem to indicate that the proposal of either an arbitrator
or an appointing authority starts the 30-day countdown. The Committee of the Whole
reported to UNCITRAL that the final rules resulted from an agreement that this article
should be restructured along the following lines:
(a) Any party may propose to the other party the name of a person who would
serve as the sole arbitrator or the name of an appointing authority which
would make such an appointment;
(b) Within 30 days from the receipt of the proposal by the other party the parties
may agree either on the choice of the sole arbitrator or on the appointing
authority;
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b. Appointment of Three Arbitrators
The streamlined approach to designation of an appointing authority
works less smoothly when three arbitrators must be named. Under article
7 the appointing authority may have to appoint both the second and the
third arbitrators. If the second party fails to appoint an arbitrator within
thirty days, the first party may immediately request the Secretary-General
of the Permanent Court to designate an appointing authority, if no ap-
pointing authority has yet been agreed upon. 62 The UNCITRAL Rules
offer no opportunity for agreement on the appointing authority, and wisely
so, for it would undoubtedly be a waste of time. A party who refuses to
appoint his own arbitrator is unlikely to agree on a person or institution
to appoint the arbitrator for him.
Once a second arbitrator is chosen, the two appointed arbitrators have
thirty days to agree upon the choice of the presiding arbitrator. 63 If they
fail, article 7 provides that "the presiding arbitrator shall be appointed
by an appointing authority in the same way as a sole arbitrator would be
appointed under article 6.''64
Under article 6, the rule for appointing a sole arbitrator, the parties
have a chance to agree on an appointing authority at the same time they
are discussing possible arbitrators. But the parties to a three-member
arbitration may have never discussed either possible arbitrators or pos-
sible appointing authorities before discovering that their arbitrators are
deadlocked. How long must they discuss these choices before resorting
to the Secretary-General? Thirty days is the only relevant time period
(c) If the parties fail to reach agreement within the prescribed 30 days, then resort
will be had to the designating authority referred to in article 7, paragraph 4
of the Rules.
Committee of the Whole 11 Report, supra note 1, at 167-68 (emphasis added). The Chairman
of the Committee of the Whole stated the same understanding at the meeting that provided
the consensus:
29. The CHAIRMAN suggested that the question of the choice of institution could
be dealt with in one paragraph which might state that, after notification of arbi-
tration, either party might propose the name of the person who should act as
arbitrator or an appointing authority, or both, and that if, after 30 days, no agree-
ment was reached, the matter should be referred to the supreme international
authority.
30. Mr. JENARD (Belgium) said that that solution was acceptable to his delegation.
31. The CHAIRMAN suggested that a small drafting group comprising the rep-
resentatives of France, the Federal Republic of Germany and either the United
Kingdom or the United States should be formed to draft an appropriate text.
32. It was so decided.
Committee of the Whole II Summary, supra note 1, SR.4, at 5 (emphasis added).
62. UNCITRAL RULES art. 7(2).
63. Id.
64. Id. art. 7(3).
SPRING 1989
98 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
stated in the Rules, but this period applies to agreement on both the
arbitrator and the appointing authority.65
The travaux pr~paratoires demonstrate that the drafters intended to
give the parties no extra time to agree on an appointing authority.66 Thus,
the rules seem to require the parties to seek agreement on an appointing
authority at the same time that the party-appointed arbitrators are seeking
agreement on the presiding arbitrator. A problem arises if the parties do
not know how the arbitrators' talks are proceeding before the thirty days
have elapsed. Unless the parties know a deadlock is probable, they are
unlikely to discuss seriously the-choice of an appointing authority. Thus,
while this provision of article 6 no doubt eliminates a potential for delay,
it creates a need for each party's arbitrator to communicate to the parties
the progress of discussions concerning the third arbitrator.67 This is in
fact the practice that has emerged from the Tribunal, where the party-
appointed arbitrators have kept the agents of the United States and Iran
informed of the progress of discussions concerning possible presiding
arbitrators.
3. Appointment Procedure Used by Appointing Authority
a. Time Limits
Once an appointing authority is designated, article 6 permits either party
to request the appointing authority to appoint the absent arbitrator.68
Upon this request the appointing authority must act "as promptly as
65. Id. arts. 6(2), 7(3).
66. See supra note 59.
67. It also necessarily suggests that communications between the parties and the party-
appointed arbitrators cannot be considered a breach of the arbitrators' duty of independence
or an improper ex parte contact. Certainly party-appointed arbitrators have a duty to as-
semble all relevant information about potential presiding arbitrators, and the opinion of the
parties on the matter should be considered both necessary and proper.
68. Article 8 of the UNCITRAL Rules requires the requesting party to provide the
appointing authority with information about the arbitration, in order to "ensure that the
appointing authority will have the information necessary to enable it to select an arbitrator
qualified to deal with the dispute in question." Report Revised Draft, supra note 1, at 169.
Article 8 reads as follows:
1. When an appointing authority is requested to appoint an arbitrator pursuant
to article 6 or article 7, the party which makes the request shall send to the
appointing authority a copy of the notice of arbitration, a copy of the contract
out of or in relation to which the dispute has arisen and a copy of the arbitration
agreement if it is not contained in the contract. The appointing authority may
require from either party such information as it deems necessary to fulfill its
function.
2. Where the names of one or more persons are proposed for appointment as
arbitrators, their full names, addresses and nationalities shall be indicated,
together with a description of their qualifications.
UNCITRAL RULES art. 8.
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possible." 69 The UNCITRAL Rules explicitly provide that an appointing
authority designated by the parties must appoint the sole arbitrator within
sixty days of a party's request. 70 In the case of a three-member panel,
the appointing authority must appoint the second arbitrator within thirty
days and, if required, the third arbitrator within sixty days. 71 In each
case, the failure of the appointing authority to meet the deadline permits
either party to ask the Secretary-General to designate a new appointing
authority. 72
The idea of placing a time clock on the appointing authority appeared
late in the drafting process. On the second reading of the rules, a sub-
committee draft was tabled that contained the thirty- and sixty-day pe-
riods. 73 The time limits were put in brackets because the subcommittee
did not agree on the provision. 74 In a spirited discussion, the drafters
emphasized that the deadline was "not a sanction against the appointing
authority but a guide to parties so that they would know when to apply
to the Secretary-General." 75 The time limits were then adopted.
69. UNCITRAL RULES art. 6(2).
70. Id.
71. Id. arts. 6(2), 7(2)(b), 7(3).
72. Id. art. 6(2).
73. Report of Drafting Group on Articles 7, 8 and 8bis, U.N. Doc. A/CN/9/9/C.2/CRP.21
(1976), at 1-3.
74. Id.
75. The report of the debate in full is as follows:
36. Mr. ROEHRICH (France) and Mr. PIRRUNG (Federal Republic of Germany)
said that the brackets in paragraph 2 should be removed; the time-limit was not
a sanction against the appointing authority but a guide to parties so that they
would know when to apply to the Secretary-General of the Permanent Court of
Arbitration at The Hague.
37. Mr. HOLTZMANN (United States of America) said that his delegation strongly
felt that it was unwise to set a time-limit. He knew of no arbitration rules, either
institutional or ad hoc, which placed such a burden on the appointing authority
without taking into account the circumstances of the case. Under the UNCITRAL
arbitration rules the appointing authority could not fully control the time in which
it could make an appointment; parties might, for example, delay in providing
information requested from them, or there might be difficulty in finding arbitrators.
The parties would then apply to the Secretary-General of the Permanent Court
of Arbitration at The Hague, and the whole process would start all over again.
38. Mr. SANDERS (Special Consultant to the UNCITRAL secretariat) agreed
with the United States representative and felt that the appointing authority should
be left to carry out its task in a normal time.
39. Mr. PIRRUNG (Federal Republic of Germany), supported by Mr. JENARD
(Belgium), said that there was a precedent for such a time-limit in the World Bank
arbitration rules, which gave the President 30 days to appoint an arbitrator. The
60 day time-limit was a guide to parties as to when they should regard the ap-
pointment procedure as unsuccessful; a time-limit of 60 days had been specified
because it had been thought that an appointing authority should be able to find
an arbitrator within two months.
40. Mr. MELIS (Austria) favored a 30-day time-limit. Two months would represent
an unnecessary delay.
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In the process, however, the drafters committed a drafting oversight,
failing to apply the time limit to an appointing authority designated by the
Secretary-General to name a sole or presiding arbitrator. The time limit
contained in article 6(2) applies by its terms only to an authority previously
"agreed upon" and not to one designated by the Secretary-General. What
happens in the event a "designated" appointing authority fails to act
within sixty days? This is no hypothetical question. Chief Justice Moons,
a designated appointing authority, was asked to name a successor for
Judge Bellet on May 1, 1983. He ultimately appointed Judge Riphagen on
July 13, 1983, more than 140 days after the United States' request. 76
Delays in naming arbitrators may be inevitable. Chief Justice Moons
undoubtedly stayed his hand to encourage continued discussions among
the United States and Iranian arbitrators. This action was quite proper;
they had, after all, only managed to reach agreement on the first group
of arbitrators several weeks after the United States asked that an ap-
pointing authority be designated. 77 But such reasons for delay will -be
common in arbitration, and in the Tribunal's case other factors were
present that arguably promoted a speedier process of naming an arbitrator
than might normally be expected. For example, the arbitrators, the par-
ties' agents, the appointing authority, and the designating authority all
had their offices within a few minutes walk of each other. This situation
is unlikely to recur in future arbitrations.
The inevitability of delay may argue against imposing any deadlines on
appointing authorities. But that is an argument for revising the rules. It
does not mean that the Rules should be read narrowly to exempt "des-
ignated" appointing authorities from the deadlines. That would create
more problems than it solves, for it would leave the parties in such cases
with no right to revert to the Secretary-General, even when the appointing
41. Mr. SZASZ (Hungary) said that, if the appointing authority was a person, that
individual could be delayed for one reason or another.
42. Mr. HOLTZMANN (United States of America) pointed out that, in the case
of the World Bank, there was a panel of arbitrators to choose from and the disputes
involved were confined to investment matters. The task of the President in ap-
pointing an arbitrator was therefore much easier.
43. The CHAIRMAN said that there appeared to be a majority in favor of removing
the brackets.
Committee of the Whole 11 Summary, supra note 1, SR.15, at 5-6.
76. In 1984 ChiefJustice Moons took 87 days (June 8 to September 3) to appoint President
Lagergren's successor.
77. Indeed, no party indicated any dissatisfaction with the time consumed by Chief
Justice Moons's efforts. There is no indication that anyone felt restrained by the lack of
express authorization in the Rules from lodging a protest they otherwise wished to assert.
Moreover, since both Judge Bellet and President Lagergren remained at the Tribunal until
their successors were appointed, the delay and inconvenience to the parties the 60-day limit
seeks to reduce was not an issue.
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authority is utterly incapacitated or refuses to act. 78 The only reasonable
reading of the UNCITRAL Rules is to treat the words "agreed upon" as
a drafting error and apply the same standards to all appointing authorities,
whether designated by the Secretary-General or agreed upon by the par-
ties. This interpretation is consistent with article 7(2)(b), which speaks of
the "appointing authority previously designated," whether by the parties
or the Secretary-General, in applying the time limit imposed on the ap-
pointing authority for naming the second arbitrator.79
As the Tribunal's experience shows, this interpretation does not mean
that the appointing authority will be held to unreasonable deadlines. The
Rules contain no penalty for exceeding the sixty-day limit unless one of
the parties believes the delay is unjustified. Even then, the objecting party
must ask the Secretary-General of the Permanent Court of Arbitration to
name a new appointing authority. 80 The Secretary-General apparently has
the discretion not to act immediately, as he is subject to no express
deadline, and thus can respond flexibly if a party unjustifiably attempts
to use the sixty-day deadline to oust an appointing authority.
b. The List Procedure
To appoint the second arbitrator of a three-member panel, the appoint-
ing authority simply uses its discretion. 81 If the appointing authority must
appoint the sole arbitrator or the presiding arbitrator, however, the UN-
CITRAL Rules encourage the use of a "list procedure." 82 The procedure
78. This is not a hypothetical situation. In 1984, Chief Justice Moons recused himself
from a challenge, apparently because the challenged arbitrator had insulted him during an
earlier dispute. See infra text accompanying notes 66-68.
79. UNCITRAL RULES art. 7(2)(b).
80. Id. art. 6(2).
81. Id. art. 7(2)(b).
82. The list procedure is set forth in article 6(3):
3. The appointing authority shall, at the request of one of the parties, appoint
the sole arbitrator as promptly as possible. In making the appointment the
appointing authority shall use the following list-procedure, unless both parties
agree that the list-procedure should not be used or unless the appointing
authority determines in its discretion that the use of the list-procedure is not
appropriate for the case:
(a) At the request of one of the parties the appointing authority shall com-
municate to both parties an identical list containing at least three names;
(b) Within 15 days after the receipt of this list, each party may return the
list to the appointing authority after having deleted the name or names
to which he objects and numbered the remaining names on the list in the
order of his preference;
(c) After the expiration of the above period of time the appointing authority
shall appoint the sole arbitrator from among the names approved on the
list returned to it and in accordance with the order or preference indicated
by the parties;
(d) If for any reason the appointment cannot be made according to this
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works like this: At the request of one of the parties the appointing au-
thority gives both parties a list containing at least three names. 83 Within
fifteen days after the receipt of the list each party must return the list to
the appointing authority after deleting any names to which he objects and
numbering the remaining names in order of preference. 84 Although the
UNCITRAL Rules do not explicitly so state, it may be supposed that a
party who does not return his list on time accepts all the names on the
list. 85 The appointing authority then appoints the sole or presiding arbi-
trator from the list, taking into account the preferences of the parties.
86
The list procedure was borrowed from the rules of the American Ar-
bitration Association, 87 and is similar to a procedure used by the Neth-
erlands Arbitration Institute and the Inter-American Commercial
Arbitration Commission. 88 Nevertheless, the idea was controversial from
the commencement of the UNCITRAL drafting process, 89 and the pro-
vision was gradually diluted. The list procedure was mandatory in early
drafts, but by the end of the drafting process the Rules provided that the
procedure can be set aside if both parties agree or if "the appointing
authority determines in its discretion that the use of the list-procedure is
not appropriate for the case." 90
Tribunal experience shows that this discretion is crucial to the func-
tioning of the appointment process. In making his first appointment, Chief
Justice Moons circulated a list. 9 ' The United States and Iran between
them managed to delete all of the names. 92 Chief Justice Moons then
turned to Judge Riphagen, whose name had not been listed.
93
procedure, the appointing authority may exercise its discretion in appointing the sole
arbitrator.
UNCITRAL RULES art. 6(3).
83. Even if it is the presiding arbitrator who is to be appointed, the list is given to the
parties and not to the arbitrators. Id. arts. 6(3)(a), 7(3).
84. Id. art. 6(3)(b).
85. Article 6(3)(c) allows the appointing authority to appoint an arbitrator from "the
lists returned to it." Thus, if a party has not returned its list, the appointing authority can
rely only upon the list which was returned, and cannot consider any deletions sought by
the party who did not return one. The American Arbitration Association's Commercial
Arbitration Rules, from which the UNCITRAL list procedure was adapted, state this point
clearly: "if a party does not return the list within the time specified, all persons named
therein shall be deemed acceptable." Rule 13, AAA RULES, supra note 21, R.13.
86. UNCITRAL RULES art. 6(3)(c).
87. Report Preliminary Draft, supra note 1, at 169; see AAA RULES, supra note 21, R. 14.
88. Report Revised Draft, supra note 1, at 169.
89. Report Discussion Preliminary Draft, supra note 1, at 30.
90. UNCITRAL RULES art. 6(3).
91. Tribunal Notes, IALR 6,783 (July 1, 1983).
92. Dutch International Law Expert Named to Replace Bellet, IALR 6,849 (July 15, 1983).
93. Id.
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The parties' action symbolizes an assumption that any arbitrator ac-
ceptable to one party is unacceptable to the other. As a result of these
suspicions, United States and Iranian arbitrators soon become reluctant
to propose any arbitrators formally for fear that any name proposed by
one side would almost automatically be rejected by the other. Names on
the Chief Justice's list were treated to equally strict scrutiny. Once a name
had been rejected, whether the name was first proposed by the party-
appointed arbitrators or by Chief Justice Moons, it became politically
difficult to appoint that person to the Tribunal. Continued use of the list
procedure could have quickly eliminated all of the most suitable candi-
dates. Presumably it was for this reason that Chief Justice Moons an-
nounced in making his second appointment that use of the list procedure
was not appropriate. 94
c. Length of Service of a Designated Appointing Authority
When Judge Bellet resigned from the Tribunal in 1983 and the arbitrators
could not agree on his successor, the United States discovered to its
surprise that Chief Justice Moons might not be the Tribunal's appointing
authority, although the Chief Justice had been named the appointing au-
thority in 1982 to decide Iran's challenge to Judge Mangard. 95 The UN-
CITRAL Rules are clear that when the parties agree on an appointing
authority he continues to perform that function from then on. When the
Secretary-General designates an appointing authority, however, the au-
thority's role in later disputes may depend on when the authority was
designated and what issue the authority was asked to decide.
Under article 6, if an arbitrator must be named and there is no "agreed
upon" authority, either party has the right to request that the Secretary-
General name an appointing authority.96 Nothing in the language of article
6(2) requires the parties to pay any attention to the appointing authority
who was previously designated by the Secretary-General. We have already
noted that the words "agreed upon" in article 6(2) must be a mistake;
the drafters simply overlooked the possibility that an appointing authority
94. The decline of the use of the list procedure continued in the most recent involvement
of the appointing authority. In the appointment process for the successors to President
Boeckstiegel and Judge Virally, Chief Justice Moons formally circulated a list with only two
names and, rather than request that unacceptable names be stricken and the others listed
in order of preference, merely invited comments from the parties. It was widely expected
that neither of the proposed candidates would be acceptable to both parties, and in fact the
party-appointed arbitrators and the appointing authority were at the same time actively
considering other candidates. Judges Arangio-Ruiz and Broms, who were not on the list,
were ultimately selected by agreement of the party-appointed arbitrators. New Arbitrators
Agreed Upon at 11th Hour, 3 MEALY'S, Special Bull. (Nov. I1, 1988).
95. See Re Judge N. Mangard, I IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. 509 (1982).
96. UNCITRAL RULES art. 6(2).
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might already be available who had not been "agreed upon." This error
also draws into question the power of a designated appointing authority
to continue in his role after making a single appointment.
It is just conceivable, however, that the drafters intended this odd result.
As discussed in greater length below, article 12(1) provides that an ap-
pointing authority previously named (apparently for any purpose) is to
decide any subsequent challenge, 97 and article 12(2) provides that the
appointing authority who sustains a challenge is also to break any deadlock
over the challenged arbitrator's successor. 98 For example, if after his
designation Chief Justice Moons had heard and sustained the challenge
to Judge Mangird, he would have been specifically authorized by article
12(2) to choose Judge Mangard's successor (assuming the parties' arbi-
trators reached an impasse). Under article 12(l)(b) he would also have
been specifically authorized to rule on a later challenge to another arbi-
trator. In contrast, article 6(2) provides no authorization for him to choose
the replacement for a resigning arbitrator such as Judge Bellet. Thus, the
specificity of the provisions in article 12 may suggest that the silence of
article 6 is deliberate. 99
More likely, however, the lack of specificity in article 6 arises out of
the expectation that normally an appointing authority will be chosen to
name an arbitrator before an authority is chosen to deal with a challenge
and that it would be highly unusual for the appointing authority to name
two presiding or sole arbitrators in a single arbitration. The Tribunal, with
its multiple chambers and thousands of cases over several years, falls
outside this expectation.
97. Id. art. 12(l)(b).
98. Id. art. 12(2).
99. The travauxprdparatoires look in the same direction. The drafters of article 12 seem
to have believed that a designated appointing authority must have its mandate renewed in
order to act as the appointing authority in later stages of the arbitration. The following
colloquy in the Committee of the Whole seems to have raised the issue quite directly:
27. Mr. PIRRUNG (Federal Republic of Germany) said that he did not think it
necessary to include the exception made at the end of article 12, paragraph 2
(providing that the authority deciding a challenge shall name the successor).
28. The CHAIRMAN said that that phrase was designed to avoid recourse to the
Secretary-General of the Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague.
29. Professor SANDERS (Special Consultant to the UNCITRAL secretariat) con-
firmed that the phrase had been included so as to avoid a lengthy procedure. Its
inclusion was, moreover, explained in the commentary.
Committee of the Whole II Summary, supra note 1, SR.5, at 4-5. The commentary mentioned
by Professor Sanders states:
With the object of preventing delay in the course of the arbitral proceedings, this
paragraph modifies the procedures applicable under article [6 or 7] by providing
that, where such procedures would require the designation of an appointing au-
thority for the appointment of an arbitrator, the appointing authority which decided
on the challenge under paragraph I shall make the appointment.
Report Revised Draft, supra note 1, at 171.
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Whether it was deliberate or not, the possibility of having to rename
an appointing authority for each decision does not make much sense, and
this ambiguity should be eliminated in any future revision of the Rules.
For the time being, however, the Secretary-General of the Permanent
Court of Arbitration has found a way to live with the problem. While the
United States believed that Chief Justice Moons should be considered
the appointing authority for all Tribunal issues, it cautiously asked the
Secretary-General to designate (or redesignate) an appointing authority
to name Judge Bellet's successor. The Secretary-General named Chief
Justice Moons a second time and declared that Moons would be the
appointing authority for all future purposes.' 0 0 Because the Secretary-
General has the power to designate the same appointing authority time
after time, this "continuing" designation appears to be within his power
as well, even though the rules do not expressly provide for such action.
Naming a permanent appointing authority does not seriously impair
party autonomy or the opportunity for parties to agree on their appointing
authority. Even after a continuing designation, the parties may still agree
on another appointing authority, although only if both are dissatisfied. 10,
The knowledge that an appointing authority designated by the Secretary-
General will continue to act in that capacity for all decisions may increase
the parties' incentive to reach agreement on an appointing authority in
the first instance. If the parties fail to agree then, chances are not bright
that they will succeed later on. Consequently, it seems unnecessary to
sacrifice the goal of swift arbitration in order to provide numerous op-
portunities for party agreement by repeatedly sending the parties back
to the Secretary-General. The UNCITRAL provisions thus may profitably
be revised to specify that the appointing authority designated will serve
for all purposes.10 2
4. Recusal of the Appointing Authority
Among the more curious questions raised by the Iran-United States
arbitration is this: When should an appointing authority recuse himself,
that is, refuse to act in a matter because his impartiality is questioned?
100. Tribunal Notes, IALR 6,448 (May 6, 1983).
101. Iran has complained about this consequence. See Letter from Judge Kashani to
Chief Justice Moons dated July 17, 1984, IALR 9,362 (Sept. 28, 1984) [hereinafter Kashani
Letter].
102. Because articles I1, 12, and 13 all incorporate the methods for choosing arbitrators
set out in articles 6-9, the problem could perhaps best be solved by adding a new provision
to the end of articles 6(2) and 7(2)(b):
In the absence of a statement by the Secretary-General or agreement by the parties
to the contrary, the person or institution designated as the Appointing Authority
by the Secretary-General will continue to act as such for all purposes during the
arbitral proceedings.
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The question is not academic; Chief Justice Moons in fact recused himself
from a challenge to a Tribunal arbitrator.
The facts are these: After rejecting Iran's challenge to Judge Mangard,
Chief Justice Moons was drawn into a brief but extraordinary correspon-
dence with the apparent spokesman for the Iranian arbitrators, Judge
Mahmoud Kashani. 10 3 In the course of the exchange, Judge Kashani
questioned Chief Justice Moons's impartiality in strident and insulting
terms: "[Y]ou have assured the interests of the United States of America
to the greatest possible degree and [your actions] have resulted in the
appointment of certain imposed arbitrators upon this international Tri-
bunal."' 0 4 Two months later, Judge Kashani was himself challenged for
conduct inconsistent with his status as an arbitrator. 105 Chief Justice Moons
was asked to rule on the challenge. He demurred, no doubt believing that
Judge Kashani's earlier personal insults might give rise to concerns about
the Chief Justice's impartiality. 106
The challenge never progressed beyond this point. The Iranian Gov-
ernment shortly replaced Judge Kashani, making the challenge moot.10 7
Yet the Chief Justice's action raises hard questions under the Rules. Be-
fore discussing them it is worth noting, that for two reasons, these ques-
tions will more likely arise in ad hoc arbitrations than in administered
arbitrations for two reasons. First, in virtually every administered arbi-
tration the parties must acknowledge that they at one time accepted the
impartiality of the institutional body. This prior acceptance makes the
notion of recusal alien to the world of administered arbitration, and indeed
arguably a violation of the principle of party autonomy. Second, an in-
stitution engaged in the administration of arbitrations can be expected to
have a thick institutional skin, and to be capable of weathering an attack,
even one as vituperative as Judge Kashani's, without raising doubts as
to its continued impartiality. Certainly this reason supports the view ex-
pressed during UNCITRAL's travaux pr~paratoires that individuals should
rarely act as appointing authorities. 0 8
But in ad hoc arbitration, the UNCITRAL Rules selection mechanism
functions in such a manner that the parties may end up with an appointing
authority they never agreed to, perhaps even an individual, who is far
103. Kashani Letter, supra note 101, at 9,362-73.
104. Id.
105. The challenge was based on his physical attack and threats on Judge Mangard. See
infra text accompanying notes 142-47.
106. U.S. Challenges Iranian Arbitrators, Appointing Authority Moons Steps Down, IALR
9,271 (Sept. 28, 1984).
107. Tehran Court Judge, Head of BILS Likely to Succeed Kashani, Shafeiei, 1ALR 9,505
(Oct. 26, 1984).
108. Committee of the Whole If Summary, supra note 1, SR. 15, at 4-5.
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more likely than an institution to have the sort of business or family ties
that could raise questions of impartiality. There seems to be no doubt
that an appointing authority may recuse itself. The Rules take note of the
possibility that an appointing authority may not just "fail" to act but may
actually "refuse [] to act." 10 9 In that event, the Secretary-General des-
ignates another appointing authority. 1 10 The real question is when, if ever,
an appointing authority should refuse to act.
The Rules offer no standards. This fact, combined with the practice of
most administering authorities, suggests that recusals should be vanish-
ingly rare. It is difficult to imagine circumstances warranting recusal by
an appointed institution that the Secretary-General has deemed capable
of acting impartially. Without attempting to pass judgment on the delicate
issues involved in Chief Justice Moons's recusal, it seems that individuals
acting as appointing authorities in normal commercial arbitration also
should be extraordinarily reluctant to force the parties to seek the des-
ignation of another appointing authority. At the very least, making recusals
a common practice would create the incentive to insult appointing
authorities.
As a practical matter, the rules governing arbitrator recusal offer some
guidance for recusal by the appointing authority, although the rules should
be narrowly construed.' 11 For example, where the parties have agreed
on an appointing authority, he should recuse himself only if the circum-
stances giving rise to the issue were unknown to the affected party at the
time of the designation. The narrow issue should be whether circum-
stances have arisen that raise justifiable doubts about the authority's im-
partiality or independence in the specific task of appointing or removing
an arbitrator.
5. Designation of the Appointing Authority
The events described above reveal that the Secretary-General of the
Permanent Court of Arbitration has played an important role in Tribunal
matters. The Secretary-General was called upon to designate an appoint-
ing authority and then to redesignate the authority when questions arose
about the continuing force of the first designation. Action was almost
required a third time when Chief Justice Moons recused himself.
Perhaps because of these events, the role of the Secretary-General has
been challenged by the Iranian arbitrators. Judge Kashani accused the
Secretary-General of a conflict of interest between his duty to be impartial
and independent and his connection to the Dutch Ministry of Foreign
109. UNCITRAL RULES arts. 6(2), 7(2)(b).
110. Id.
11. Id. arts. 10, 11; see infra text accompanying notes 154-61.
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Affairs, which Judge Kashani derived from the structure of the Permanent
Court of Arbitration:
The Dutch Foreign Minister or his deputy convenes and presides over the
Court's Administrative Council; moreover, the Secretary-General, who has no
duties of consequence, is in practice selected from among the diplomatic corps
of the Dutch Foreign Ministry. In accordance with Article 9 of the Bylaws of
the Administrative Council, the Secretary-General is directly responsible to the
Dutch Foreign Minister.1
12
According to Judge Kashani, this structure meant that the Secretary-
General necessarily serves the interests of the Netherlands and, by ex-
tension, the interests of the United States and its nationals because of the
friendship between the United States and the Netherlands."13
Judge Kashani's charges have a superficial basis in fact but are not en-
tirely accurate. The signatories of the two conventions creating the Court
of Permanent Arbitration also created a Permanent Administrative Council
for the Court. 114 The Administrative Council is comprised of the signa-
tories' diplomatic representatives to The Hague, and its President is indeed
the Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs. 115 The Administrative Council meets
once or twice a year to oversee the administrative affairs of the Permanent
Court of Arbitration,' 16 which are carried out by a small International Bu-
reau. 117 Although the two conventions creating the Court are silent about
the staffing of the International Bureau, the Administrative Council's in-
ternal rules, adopted in 1900, declare that the head of the International Bu-
reau is the Court's Secretary-General. 118 The Secretary-General is
appointed and directed by the Administrative Council. 119 He receives or-
ders through the Council's President, who is, it is true, the Dutch Minister
of Foreign Affairs. 120 The Secretary-General's responsibility plainly runs
to the entire Council, however, not just to its President, and as an inter-
national civil servant (a concept well developed by the International Court
of Justice and the U.N. Charter), his primary loyalties are to the interna-
tional organization he serves, not to his own government. 121
Contrary to Judge Kashani's suggestion, the Secretary-General is not
always selected from the Dutch diplomatic corps, although it is true that
112. Kashani Letter, supra note 101, at 9,362; 9,365 n.3; 9,372.
113. Id. at 9,366-72.
114. Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, Oct. 18, 1907, art.
49, 54 L.N.T.S. 435, U.S.T.S. 536, 36 Stat. 2199. International Convention for the Pacific




118. Rdglement d'Ordre du Conseil Administratif, Sept. 19, 1900, art. 8.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. art. 9.
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all nine Secretaries-General have been Dutch nationals, and most have
had a close previous connection to the Dutch Government. According to
the current Secretary-General:
Of the nine Secretaries-General who have been appointed so far by the Ad-
ministrative Council, three were former Secretaries-General of the Netherlands
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, one has held the function of First Secretary of the
Permanent Court, one was a former legal adviser of the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, two were former members of the Netherlands Parliament and the re-
maining two (including myself) were retired officials of the Netherlands Foreign
Service. 122
Complete impartiality and independence are, of course, the standards of
conduct for any Secretary-General, and past ties to the Dutch Government
could not properly influence a Secretary-General in carrying out his duties
as designating authority.
It is worth noting in this context that the discussions on the draft
UNCITRAL Rules provoked some criticism of the Secretary-General as
"authority of last resort." Some critics believed that the Permanent Court
of Arbitration lacked sufficient experience in the practice of commercial
arbitration and did not have a universal character. 123 Right up to the final
draft, the UNCITRAL Rules gave the parties a choice between the
Secretary-General and another body to be established under United Na-
tions' auspices. 124 The Commission deleted this option because it ex-
pected infrequent recourse to the authority of last resort and consequently
the creation of a special United Nations body was not necessary.125 The
Commission also considered that involvement by a United Nations body,
like UNCITRAL itself, in individual disputes would not be appropriate. ' 26
Plainly there is a risk that unhappiness with the results of an arbitration
will lead to unhappiness with the appointing authority and eventually to
unhappiness with the designating authority. Judge Kashani's charges
emphasize the delicacy and importance of the Secretary-General's role.
The tradition of choosing a Secretary-General who has served in the
Dutch Government suggests that the Secretary-General exercise partic-
ular care when designating appointing authorities in cases affecting the
Netherlands. 127
122. Letter from J. Varekamp to S. A. Baker (Feb. 10, 1986).
123. Report Discussion Preliminary Draft, supra note 1, at 26.
124. Report Revised Draft, supra note 1, at 161.
125. Committee of the Whole HI Report, supra note 1, at 168.
126. Eighth Session Record, supra note 1, SR.163, at 143-44.
127. Certainly the Secretary-General will wish to bear in mind the suggestion of article
6(4): "In making the appointment, the appointing authority ... shall take into account ...
the advisability of appointing an arbitrator of a nationality other than the nationality of the
parties." UNCITRAL RULES. By the same token, a Dutch national should rarely be des-
ignated appointing authority when only one arbitrating party is a Dutch national.
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The Tribunal, however, does not even adjudicate cases affecting the
Netherlands. 128 Moreover, Iran and the United States agreed to arbitrate
in the Netherlands, so they could hardly be surprised at having a distin-
guished Dutch jurist as the appointing authority.
While it might at some point be appropriate to evaluate the role of the
Secretary-General in designating appointing authorities, in light of ex-
perience, one thing is clear: Offering a choice of designating authorities
would be a disaster. Parties seeking an edge over their opponent would
pore over the past designations of each, hoping to find and exploit dif-
ferences between the two. This opportunity would encourage generali-
zations and assumptions of bias that would eventually undercut the
reputation of both bodies. Having two possible bodies would also en-
courage confusion and a "race to the courthouse" whenever an appointing
authority became necessary. In the Tribunal, for example, it is easy to
imagine both parties asking different authorities to rule on the Mangard
challenge or the Bellet replacement.1 29 Rules would then be necessary to
decide which body should act in such circumstances. If an early request
to one authority gives that party priority, parties seeking an advantage
would rush to their preferred body as early as possible, without taking
time to try to agree on an appointing authority. No more pointless source
of arbitral delay and dispute can be imagined.
If any practical lesson is to be learned from past experience, it is that
the prior designation by the parties of an appointing authority in the
original arbitration agreement (as encouraged in the UNCITRAL Model
Arbitration Clause) is a wise course of action. Agreement while relations
are still amicable can prevent considerable bickering later.
III. Challenge and Replacement of Arbitrators
Articles 9 to 14 deal with the method by which arbitrators may be
changed in the course of the arbitration. Articles 9 to 12 provide for and
regulate challenges. Article 13 governs resignation, death, and removal
for failure or inability to act. Article 14 provides rules for the repetition
of hearings after the replacement of an arbitrator.
A. GROUNDS FOR A CHALLENGE (ARTICLES 9-10)
1. Tribunal Experience
In a Tribunal expected to last at least a decade and to decide several
hundred cases, the rules for replacement of arbitrators were bound to be
128. The Netherlands might be affected by Tribunal decisions only in the limited and
indirect sense that as a NATO Alliance partner some decisions concerning disputed sales
of U.S. military equipment to Iran might bear some tenuous relationship to Dutch interests.
129. See supra text at note 76.
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invoked fairly often. As discussed earlier, with twenty-three arbitrators
having filled the nine seats, there has been a substantial turnover among
the arbitrators. But the questions arising under articles 9 to 14 have been
far more novel than anyone could have predicted.
On January 1, 1982, before the Tribunal had ever begun hearing claims,
Iran challenged Judge Mangard, one of the three "third-country" arbi-
trators Iran's own arbitrators had agreed to six months earlier, alleging
that he was not "neutral." 130 This challenge was not sustained, but there-
after the first group of arbitrators named by Iran carried on a vehement
campaign against the Tribunal, whose awards they deplored. In 1983, for
example, as the Tribunal began issuing some of its first contested awards,
Judge Sani and Judge Shafeiei refused to sign the awards. 13 1 Both Iranian
arbitrators issued public explanations disclosing previously confidential
details about the Tribunal's deliberations and claiming that they were not
allowed full participation in the process. Judge Sani's claim that he was
not present at the deliberations and that the other two judges in Chamber
Three had acted without consulting him provoked the American arbitrator,
Richard Mosk, to issue statements of his own pointing out that Judge Sani
had chosen not to participate in deliberations. Between them, Judges
Mosk and Sani provided a blow-by-blow account of the panel's deliber-
ative process. 132
In May 1983, accusations surfaced of even more egregious breaches of
the confidentiality of Tribunal deliberations. An Iranian arbitrator appar-
130. The facts relating to the challenge are disclosed in Re Judge N. Mangard, I IRAN-
U.S. C.T.R. 111 (1982), which is the decision of the Full Tribunal finding that Iran's challenge
had to be dealt with by an appointing authority pursuant to the UNCITRAL Rules, and in
Re Judge N. MangArd, I IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. 509 (1982), which is the decision of the appointing
authority rejecting the challenge.
131. See Granite State Mach. Co. v. Iran, Award No. 18-30-3, 1 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. 452
(1983) (Opinion of Judge Jahangir Sani); id. at 449 (Concurring Opinion of Richard M. Mosk);
Raygo Wagner Equip. Co. v. Star Line Iran Co., Award No. 20-17-3, 1 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R.
415 (1983) (Mr. Jahangir Sani's Reasons for Not Signing); id. at 424 (Comments of Richard
M. Mosk); id. at 428 (Mr. Jahangir Sani's Reply); Rexnord, Inc. v. Iran, Award No. 21-
132-3, 2 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. 14 (1983) (Mr. Jahangir Sani's Reasons for Not Signing); id. at
27 (Concurring Opinion of Richard M. Mosk); Chas. T. Main Int'l, Inc. v. Mahab Consulting
Eng'rs, Award No. 70-185-3, 3 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. 270, 276 (1983) (Explanation for Failure
of Judge Sani to Sign Awards); id. at 124 (Dr. Shafeiei's Reasons for Not Signing Awards);
id. at 145 (Comments of George H. Aldrich on J. Shafeiei's Reasons for Non-Signature of
Awards in the following cases: Nat'l Airmotive Corp. v. Iran, Award No. 58-449-3, 3 IRAN-
U.S. C.T.R. 91 (1983); Intrend Int'l, Inc. v. Imperial Iranian Air Force, Award No. 59-
220-2, 3 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. 110 (1983); Reynolds Metal Co. v. Iran, Award No. 60-83-2, 3
IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. 119 (1983); Gruen Assocs., Inc. v. Iran Hous. Co., Award No. 61-188-
2, 3 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. 97 (1983)), see also Shafeiei Absence-Iran Protests Chamber 2
Actions to Dutch Court, IALR 6,905 (Aug. 5, 1983); Shafeiei Protests Chamber 2 Awards
Made Without Him, IALR 7,038 (Aug. 19, 1983); Sani Resigns, Raising Questions Over
Future Chamber Proceedings, IALR 7,037-38 (Aug. 19, 1983).
132. See cases cited supra note 131; see generally Iran, U.S. Arbitrators Dispute Awards
Procedures, IALR 6,452-54 (May 6, 1983).
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ently revealed to an Iranian party the amount and reasoning of a draft
award against the Iranian party. Not surprisingly, the Iranian party im-
mediately entered into an "eleventh hour" settlement with the claim-
ant. 133 At much the same time, another Iranian arbitrator apparently
encouraged an Iranian party to submit evidence after the close of the
hearings in order to satisfy questions raised during deliberations. 134
In July 1983, Judge Shafeiei left The Hague while several awards were
pending in Chamber Two. 135 The Chairman of Chamber Two, Judge Bel-
let, was scheduled to retire on July 31, 1983, and the Tribunal's President
had issued an order in June requiring Chamber Two to stay in session
until that date. 136 Judge Shafeiei's absence could have crippled the Cham-
ber. If the awards under consideration were not issued by July 31, there
was every reason to believe that Judge Beilet would be unable to sign
them, and hearings would presumably have to be repeated for the new
presiding arbitrator. 137 The Chamber ultimately solved the problem by
issuing four awards without Judge Shafeiei's signature. 138
Then, in August 1983, Judge Sani resigned from Chamber Three sud-
denly and without notice. 139 His resignation was communicated to the
Tribunal by the Government of Iran. Delays in designating a successor
could have caused months of inactivity in the Chamber. The Tribunal
voted not to accept the resignation until Iran named a successor.140 Iran
finally did so, but several awards were issued in the interim without Judge
Sani's signature. 141 During this entire period the Iranian judges made no
attempt in their dissenting opinions to disguise the contempt in which
they held the other arbitrators and the Tribunal staff.
133. ITT Indus. Inc. v. Iran, Award No. 47-156-2, 2 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. 348, 356-58
(1983); see Rexnord, Inc. v. Iran, Award No. 21-132-3, 2 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. 14, 28 n.3
(1983) (comments of Judge Mosk implying that respondents initiated settlement upon Judge
Sani's recommendations after the decision in the case was made but before it was published).
134. Ultrasystems, Inc. v. Iran, Award No. 27-84-3, 2 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. 114, 121-23
(1983) (Mosk, J., concurring) (telexes were sent to Tribunal by Iranian bank just before final
deliberations, admittedly at request of Iranian arbitrator). See Tribunal Notes, IALR 6,703
(June 17, 1983).
135. Iran Protests Chamber 2 Actions to Dutch Court, IALR 6,905 (Aug. 5, 1983).
136. Presidential Order No. 10 (June 15, 1983).
137. TRIBUNAL RULES, supra note 6, art. 14; see infra text at note 236.
138. See Nat'l Airmotive Corp. v. Iran, Award No. 58-449-3, 3 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. 91
(1983); Intrend Int'l, Inc. v. Imperial Iranian Air Force, Award No. 59-220-2, 3 IRAN-U.S.
C.T.R. 110 (1983); Reynolds Metal Co. v. Iran, Award No. 60-83-2, 3 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R.
119 (1983); Gruen Assocs., Inc. v. Iran Hous. Co., Award No. 61-188-2, 3 IRAN-U.S.
C.T.R. 97 (1983). See also Comments of George H. Aldrich, supra note 131, 3 IRAN-U.S.
C.T.R. at 146.
139. Sani Resigns, Raising Questions Over Future of Chamber Proceedings, IALR 7,037
(Aug. 19, 1983).
140. Iran Appoints Successor to Replace Sani, IALR 7,155 (Sept. 16, 1983).
141. See Chamber 3 Hands Down Five Arbitral A wards Without Sani, IALR 7,156 (Sept.
16, 1983); see also cases cited supra note 131.
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One year later, in September 1984, came the most remarkable event of
all. The agent of the United States gave an eyewitness account of an
attack on Judge Mangdrd that has never been contested. It deserves ex-
tensive quotation:
The attack took place at approximately 9:30 a.m. Witnesses reported that
Mr. Kashani and Mr. Shafeiei appeared to be waiting for Mr. Mangard as he
descended the Tribunal stairs on his way to the scheduled meeting [at which
Mr. Mangard was expected to be named acting President]. When he walked
within their reach, they began to yell at him, grabbed him, and began to force
him towards the Tribunal's main door. Mr. Mangard was shoved down the hall
almost to the Tribunal's door. Mr. Kashani held Mr. Mangard at the throat by
the necktie and was twisting the necktie and shaking his victim. The attackers
were continuing to shove Mr. Mangard toward the door. The U.S. Agent joined
others who were trying to release Mr. Kashani's grip from Mr. Mangard's neck.
According to observers, Mr. Shafeiei was beating Mr. Mangard on the back
with his fists.
Several others present, including several Iranian attorneys and staff members,
also intervened to release Mr. Kashani's hold at Mr. Mangard's throat and to
separate Mr. Mangard from his attackers. Several Iranians then physically re-
strained Messrs. Kashani and Shafeiei. The two continued to shout and make
threatening gestures and to block Mr. Mangard's access to the main hall of the
Tribunal building. For Mr. Mangard's personal safety, he was rushed into an
adjacent small room occupied by the Tribunal's telephone operator. Messrs.
Kashani and Shafeiei remained by the telephone room door, and several per-
sons, including the Deputy Agent of the United States, stood between them
and the door until the police arrived to assume the protection of Mr. MangArd.
When the police arrived, Mr. Kashani began shouting and made emphatic
gestures in an attempt to prevent their entry. Mr. Kashani's Iranian colleagues
again restrained him. The police then tried to escort Mr. Mangard out of the
telephone room. When Mr. MangArd came out of the room into the view of Mr.
Kashani and Mr. Shafeiei, they resumed shouting that Mr. Mangard could not
enter the Tribunal and that they would not permit him to go anywhere but
outside the building. Mr. Shafeiei again physically assaulted Mr. Mangard, flail-
ing at him with fists as Tribunal staff members and the U.S. Deputy Agent
stood between them attempting to deflect the blows.
In the face of this sustained attack, Mr. Mangard left the Tribunal building
under police escort and stood outside for a time. The two attacking Iranian
Arbitrators remained in the entry foyer. They shouted that they would not permit
Mr. Mangard's safe reentry and intended to renew their physical assault upon
him if he attempted to reenter the building.' 42
Although Judge Mangard stated his wish to reenter the Tribunal build-
ing, President Lagergren would not permit his return, stating that he could
not ensure his safety. Instead, he sent Judge Mangard home and allowed
Mangard's two attackers to stay. From the Tribunal offices, Judge Kashani
142. Memorandum to Chief Justice Moons by John R. Crook (Sept. 17, 1984), IALR
9,344-45 (Sept. 28, 1984). See also Iranian Arbitrators Attack Mangatrd, IALR 9,170 (Sept.
5, 1984); Hostilities Threaten Future of Tribunal on U.S.-Iran Claims, Washington Post,
Oct. 3, 1984, Sec. A, at 23; Slow Pace for Iran Claims, N.Y. Times, Nov. 14, 1984, Sec.
D, at 1, col. 3.
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issued continuing threats against Judge Mangard: "[I]f Mangard ever dares
to enter the Tribunal chamber again, either his corpse or my corpse will
leave it rolling down the stairs." 143
These threats had their intended effect. President Lagergren "post-
pone[d] all proceedings" until further notice,144 leaving Mangard outside
and Kashani and Shafeiei inside the Tribunal. Work was halted until De-
cember 1984.145
In the end, the crisis was resolved not by the Tribunal but by the two
nations. The United States challenged both Iranian judges, 146 and not
long thereafter Iran withdrew them. 147 Iran eventually named two new
arbitrators, and Judge Mangard returned to hear and decide several more
cases. He stepped down from full-time duties in April 1985 at the age of
seventy, but he continued to work on cases he had heard during his tenure,
finally completing his Tribunal duties in July 1987.148
Less dramatic circumstances have also tested the Rules' challenge pro-
cedures at the Tribunal. For example, Iran considered, but ultimately did
not press, a challenge to the appointment of Judge Virally as Chairman
of Chamber Three because of past relationships with claimants in Cham-
ber Three. 149 Iran also considered challenges of American arbitrator Charles
N. Brower. 150
143. Quoted from Memorandum to Chief Justice Moons, supra note 142, IALR 9,345.
Kashani's written statements were less strident but equally unrepentant. In a memo to
President Lagergren issued three days after the attack, the Iranian arbitrators seemed to
justify the attack by suggesting that Judge MangArd had improperly allied himself with the
United States: "So long as the jointly-appointed presiding arbitrators are devoid of inde-
pendence and neutrality and fail to enjoy the consent of one of the two Parties, the other
Party should not nurture the expectation that attaining its objectives will be unattended by
apprehension and anxiety."Id. at 9,346.
144. Presidential Order No. 27 (Sept. 5, 1984), IALR 9,354 (Sept. 28, 1984); see also
Presidential Order No. 28 (Sept. 13, 1984) (continuing the shutdown), and No. 29 (Sept. 19,
1984) (extending the shutdown and setting up a special chamber to deal with awards on
agreed terms only), IALR 9,354 (Sept. 28, 1984).
145. In addition, the meeting at which Judge Mangard was to be named acting President
of the Tribunal was never held and, needless to say, Judge Mangard was never appointed
to that position.
146. U.S. Challenges Iranian Arbitrators, IALR 9,271, 9,343 (Sept. 28, 1984).
147. Tehran Court Judge, Head of BILS Likely to Succeed Kashani, Shafeiei, IALR
9,505 (Oct. 26, 1984).
148. See Sedco, Inc. v. National Iranian Oil Co., Award No. 309-129-3, 15 IRAN-U.S.
C.T.R. 23 (1987).
149. Upon his appointment Judge Virally disclosed that he had previously been retained
as an independent legal expert in two separate arbitrations to write an opinion of legal issues
for two U.S. oil companies affiliated with claimants, Mobil Oil Corporation and Aminoil,
whose cases were pending in Chamber Three. Letter of Mr. Virally to President Boeckstiegel,
April 22, 1985. President Boeckstiegel set a deadline for objection of June 28, 1985. Iran
requested, but was not given, an extension to that date, and ultimately raised no challenge.
See Letters of President Boeckstiegel to the Agents dated July 3, 1985, and July 12, 1985.
150. Upon Judge Brower's original appointment as substitute arbitrator, Iran raised the
issue of his former law firm's relationship with several Tribunal claimants, but made no
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In late 1988 Iran carried through with a second challenge to a third-
country arbitrator. On September 13, 1988, Iran challenged Judge Robert
Briner, Chairman of Chamber Two, alleging that it had just learned that
Judge Briner had until recently been a director and member of the board
of a subsidiary of the international investment banking firm Morgan Stan-
ley & Co., employees of which had been important witnesses for the
claimant in a case already heard by the Chamber, but not yet decided.
Iran asserted that Judge Briner's professional connections with the sub-
sidiary of the corporate employer of the witness in a case, as well as his
failure to disclose that relationship to the parties, required his disquali-
fication as to that particular case. 15 1
Judge Briner denied any impropriety and refused to accept the chal-
lenge. Judge Briner stated his belief that there could be no conflict of
interest or duty of disclosure because the subsidiary at issue was an
inactive shell with no office or staff, because his position was largely
titular and involved no contact with the entity or any of the individuals
involved in the cases, because he took steps to resign his position as soon
as he was aware of the problem, and because the rules govern relationships
with parties, not witnesses. 152 The United States did not agree to the
challenge, and the matter was referred to the appointing authority, Chief
Justice Moons, for decision. 153
The events at the Tribunal provide a remarkably complete background
for discussion of the two standards set by the UNCITRAL Rules for the
conduct of arbitrators, and the grounds for challenge. The Rules allow
the challenge of an arbitrator on the basis of "justifiable doubts as to the
arbitrator's impartiality or independence." 154 They also permit the chal-
lenge and replacement of an arbitrator who "fails to act or in the event
of the dejure or defacto impossibility of his performing his functions." 55
Both bases of challenge have been invoked in the Tribunal.
formal challenge. Tribunal Notes, IALR 6,448 (May 6, 1983). Later, after Judge Brower's
appointment as Member of the Tribunal, in January 1987 he took a temporary 3-month leave
of absence to serve as Deputy Special Counsellor to President Reagan. Iran again raised
the possibility of a challenge to Judge Brower, purporting to reserve the right to do so, but
ultimately raised no challenge. Letter from Mr. Eshragh to President Boeckstiegel dated
January 23, 1987.
151. See Memorandum in Support of Challenge to Mr. Robert Briner at 1-3 (Sept. 28,
1988) reprinted in 3 MEALY'S No. 18, § G (Oct. 21, 1988).
152. See Letter of Judge Briner to Mr. Eshragh dated Sept. 7, 1988, reprinted in id. § G,
at 64-65.
153. At the time this article went to press the matter was still under consideration by the
appointing authority.
154. UNCITRAL RULES art. 10.
155. Id., art. 13(2); see infra note 213.
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2. Impartiality and Independence
Under Article 9 of the UNCITRAL Rules 156 a prospective arbitrator
must inform those who approach him in connection with his possible
appointment about any circumstances likely to give rise to justifiable
doubts about his impartiality or independence. 157 Once appointed, the
arbitrator must disclose these circumstances to the other party, if he has
not already done so. 158 The purpose of such disclosure is to prevent the
appointment of arbitrators who could later be successfully challenged,
and to insure that any challenges occur early in the proceedings, thus
producing a minimum of disruption. 159 The duty of disclosure is a con-
tinuing obligation; an arbitrator has to inform the parties if new circum-
stances arise that may bring into question his impartiality and
independence. 160 Whether upon initial or subsequent disclosure, article
10 of the Rules permits a party to challenge an arbitrator if it discovers
"justifiable doubts as to the arbitrator's impartiality." 161
The Tribunal Rules modified the disclosure obligation under article 9
of the UNCITRAL Rules to reflect the multi-case nature of the Tribunal.
The modified Rule requires any member of the Tribunal who obtains
knowledge that a particular case before the Tribunal involves circum-
stances likely to raise doubts about his impartiality or independence with
respect to that case, to notify the President of the Tribunal, rather than
the parties. The President then decides whether the parties must be no-
tified. 162 This change modifies, for particular cases, the duty of an arbi-
trator to divulge to the parties any possible source of bias in that it
156. UNCITRAL RULES, supra note 1, art. 9 provides:
A prospective arbitrator shall disclose to those who approach him in connection
with his possible appointment any circumstances likely to give rise to justifiable
doubts as to his impartiality or independence. An arbitrator, once appointed or
chosen, shall disclose such circumstances to the parties unless they have already
been informed by him of these circumstances.
157. Id.; see Report Preliminary Draft, supra note 1, at 171.
158. UNCITRAL RULES art. 9.
159. Report Revised Draft, supra note 1, at 170.
160. Report Preliminary Draft, supra note 1, at 171-2.
161. UNCITRAL RULES art. 10 states:
1. Any arbitrator may be challenged if circumstances exist that give rise to
justifiable doubts as to the arbitrator's impartiality or independence.
2. A party may challenge the arbitrator appointed by him only for reasons of
which he becomes aware after the appointment has been made.
162. Article 9 of the Tribunal Rules reads as follows:
When any member of the arbitral tribunal obtains knowledge that any particular
case before the arbitral tribunal involves circumstances likely to give rise to
justifiable doubts as to his impartiality or independence with respect to that case,
he shall disclose such circumstances to the President and, if the President so
determines, to the arbitrating parties in the case and, if appropriate, shall disqualify
himself as to that case.
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interposes the President of the Tribunal as a "check" on what information
need be disclosed.
The understandable purpose behind the Tribunal's modification is to
avoid unnecessary challenges based upon trivial circumstances unlikely
to induce partiality, while still permitting disclosure to a disinterested and
authoritative person. Nevertheless, the Tribunal's modification to the rule
should be limited to the Tribunal's unique situation. If a fact gives rise
to questions of partiality in an arbitrator's mind, it is best to disclose to
the parties rather than rely on another person's confidential determination,
which still could be challenged much later and have a devastating impact
on the parties. Article 9 of the UNCITRAL Rules is adequate without
the Tribunal's modification in nearly all normal commercial arbitrations.
Nevertheless, the above discussion still leaves unanswered the central
question of what constitutes "impartiality and independence" under the
UNCITRAL Rules. Impartiality and independence are defined only by
indirection. For example, impartiality does not require that the arbitrator's
nationality be different from the nationality of the parties. This is clear
from article 6(4) of the UNCITRAL Rules, which imposes no limit on
nationality for arbitrators appointed by the parties or presiding arbitrators
appointed by the parties' arbitrators, and in the case of arbitrators ap-
pointed by an appointing authority merely instructs the appointing au-
thority to "take into account ... the advisability of appointing an arbitrator
of a nationality other than the nationalities of the parties." 163
The travaux preparatoires of the Rules offer some additional clarifi-
cation. The draft Rules contained a nonexclusive list of factors that could
give rise to justifiable doubts, i.e., any financial or personal interest in
the outcome of the arbitration or any family or commercial tie with either
party or with a party's counsel or agent. 164 The Commission widely agreed
that any financial or personal interest in the outcome of the arbitration
should be a ground for challenge. 165 There was debate, however, about
whether to treat "commercial ties" and "family ties" as grounds for
challenge. 166
In this respect it was suggested that the grounds for challenge be divided
into "absolute" and "relative" grounds. The former category included
163. UNCITRAL RULES art. 6(4). In the drafts, the sole and presiding arbitrators were
required to have a nationality different from the nationality of the parties. See Report
Preliminary Draft, supra note 1, at 170; Report Revised Draft, supra note 1, at 161. This
provision was deleted in favor of free choice by the parties by the Committee of the Whole
11 and replaced by the suggestion in article 6(4) limited to arbitrators appointed by the
appointing authority. See Committee of the Whole If Report, supra note 1, at 166.
164. See Report Preliminary Draft, supra note 1, at 171; Report Revised Draft, supra
note 1, at 162, 170.
165. Report Discussion Preliminary Draft, supra note 1, at 32.
166. Id.
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only a direct personal or financial interest in the outcome of the arbitration,
and certain specified ties, such as close family ties between an arbitrator
and a party. Proof of these grounds would automatically result in the
success of the challenge. The latter category included other grounds, such
as remote family ties. For a challenge based on these grounds to succeed,
the protesting party would have to prove not only that the suspect grounds
existed, but that they gave rise to "justifiable doubts" about the impar-
tiality or independence of the arbitrator. 167 In the end, the delegates ap-
parently realized that the effort to define the grounds for challenge was
unlikely to produce useful guidance for most cases. In addition, they
recognized the risk of encouraging illegitimate challenges or too narrowly
circumscribing the grounds for a proper challenge. It was finally decided
to delete any list of circumstances from the text of the official UNCITRAL
Rules. 168 Thus, the appointing authority has the responsibility to decide
what constitutes lack of impartiality and independence in a particular
case. While no authority should decide a close case without reviewing
the factors discussed in UNCITRAL's deliberations, the factors provide
only a starting point.
Tribunal experience suggests the wisdom of the Rules' silence on this
point. The 1984 attack on Judge Mangard by two Iranian arbitrators was
an obvious breach of arbitral decorum. It goes without saying that any
arbitrator who tries to influence another arbitrator's official acts by means
of violence should be removed at once. Yet such acts do not demonstrate
direct commercial or family ties to one of the parties. Indeed, in its
challenge of the two Iranian arbitrators, the United States was somewhat
hard-pressed to characterize a physical attack by two arbitrators on a
third as evidence of partiality or lack of independence. 169
The United States managed to bring the physical attack upon Judge
Mangard within the reach of the Rules by arguing that a truly impartial
arbitrator would have no reason to carry his disagreements with other
arbitrators to the point of disrupting arbitral proceedings and breaching
arbitral decorum.170 The Iranian arbitrators' resort to violence was con-
sidered a sign that they were unduly biased in favor of the Iranian side.
This reasoning is certainly sufficient to justify the challenge, but had the
Rules contained a list of disqualifying factors, the absence of some specific
reference to physical attacks on other arbitrators might well have made
a challenge more difficult.
167. Id. at 32-33.
168. Committee of the Whole 1I Report, supra note 1, at 173.
169. See Memorandum to Chief Justice Moons, supra note 142, IALR 9,347-48.
170. Id. at 9,349-50.
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Iran's challenge to Judge Briner similarly, although much less dramat-
ically, confirms the advantage of a general rather than specific definition
of impartiality and independence. That challenge was not based on com-
mercial or family ties to any party, but rather on a past professional
relationship between Judge Briner and an affiliate of a party's expert
witness, which the draft rule would not have specifically included. Without
venturing to suggest whether that particular challenge had merit, there
can be no doubt that in some cases close family or financial ties to an
important witness could be a legitimate concern if the nature of the re-
lationship renders the arbitrator incapable of assessing the witness's cred-
ibility with objectivity.171
The challenge to Judge Briner raised a number of other issues. One is
the distinction between circumstances that must be disclosed, and cir-
cumstances that justify disqualification upon challenge. Article 9 requires
disclosure of "any circumstances likely to give rise to justifiable doubts"
as to the arbitrator's impartiality or independence. 172 But the mere "like-
lihood" of such doubts is not grounds for disqualification-otherwise
every disclosure would require disqualification. Article 10 sets out the
standard for disqualification: a challenge will be sustained "if circum-
stances exist that give rise to justifiable doubts as to the arbitrator's im-
partiality or independence." 173 Thus, an arbitrator is required to disclose
information that he believes does not in fact raise justifiable doubts, if he
knows that the information would likely raise such doubts. An arbitrator
may know of extenuating circumstances mitigating the effect of a suspect
relationship, for example, but if an objective observer would find it "likely"
171. The question of challenge based on an arbitrator's relationship with a witness is
virtually absent in the literature. No national arbitration statutes or institutional arbitration
rules include a relationship with a witness as a disqualifying factor, and no case in any
jurisdiction has ever disqualified an arbitrator or set aside an award for that reason. de
Vries, International Commercial Arbitration: A Contractual Substitute for National Courts,
57 TULANE L. REV. 42, 52 (1982); Abrams, The Integrity of the Arbitral Process, 76 MICH.
L. REV. 231, 246 (1977); A. REDFERN & M. HUNTER, LAW AND PRACTICE OF INTERNA-
TIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 170-74 (1986); W. CRAIG, W. PARK & J. PAULSSON,
INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE ARBITRATION 35-49 (1984); Merit Ins. Co. v.
Leatherby Ins. Co., 714 F.2d 673, 680 (7th Cir. 1983); U.S. Wrestling Federation v. Wrestling
Div. of AAU, Inc., 605 F.2d 313 (7th Cir. 1979); Peabody v. Rotan Mosle, Inc., 677 F. Supp.
1135 (M.D. Fla. 1987). However, proposed ethical standards for arbitration which have
attempted to go beyond the decisions or the common practice have listed as a disqualifying
factor a close relationship with a party's important witness. See Int'l Bar Association
Guidelines for International Arbitrators, Art. 3.3,26 I.L.M. 583 (1987); American Arbitration
Association and American Bar Association Code of Ethics for Arbitrators in Commerce
Disputes, Canon II(A)(2), reprinted in 33 Bus. LAWYER 308, 311 (1977).
172. UNCITRAL RULES art. 9 (emphasis added).
173. Id. art. 10 (emphasis added).
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that the circumstances might raise justifiable doubts, it would appear that
disclosure is necessary.
But what if the arbitrator fails to disclose? Is a breach of article 9 itself
grounds for disqualification? In its challenge to Judge Briner, Iran argued
that it was.174 The UNCITRAL Rules do not attach any consequence to
the failure to disclose, however, and so it must be concluded that a breach
of article 9 is not itself sufficient grounds for disqualification. The decision
whether to disclose is left to the arbitrator's good faith discretion, after
all, and there is necessarily room for honest difference of opinion as to
whether a particular relationship should have been disclosed. The ap-
pointing authority's opinion that a fact should have been disclosed should
not by itself lead to disqualification.
Failure to disclose may thus be relevant, if it is a circumstance giving
rise to doubts as to an arbitrator's impartiality under article 10. Whether
nondisclosure raises such doubts would depend on whether the failure to
disclose was inadvertent or intentional, whether the failure to disclose
was the result of an honest exercise of discretion, whether the facts not
disclosed obviously raised questions about impartiality and independence,
and whether the nondisclosure is an aberration on the part of a consci-
entious arbitrator or appears to be part of a pattern of circumstances
raising doubts as to impartiality. This balancing is for the appointing
authority to perform in each particular case.
The disruption to the arbitration and expense to the parties are poten-
tially much greater from a challenge late in the proceedings than from a
challenge at the time an arbitrator is chosen or at the beginning of the
arbitration. The UNCITRAL challenge Rules are therefore structured to
ensure that any challenge is made before the arbitration begins if possible,
or in any event at the earliest possible moment. A challenge may never-
theless justifiably arise late in the proceedings, however, if that is when
the facts giving rise to the challenge occurred or were first discovered.
This possibility raises the question whether the stage at which the chal-
lenge arises can be relevant to the result of the challenge; that is, whether
the appointing authority should properly be more willing to sustain a
challenge early when the costs will be small, and more reluctant to do so
later, when the costs may be substantial. The challenge to Judge MangArd,
for example, was rejected as baseless, but had it been sustained, the costs
to the parties and disruption of proceedings would have been minimal,
since Judge Mangard had not yet heard any Tribunal cases or reviewed
174. Memorandum in Support of Challenge to Mr. Robert Briner, supra note 151, at 31-
32. In support, Iran cited the IBA's Guidelines, art. 4.1: Failure to make disclosure creates
an appearance of bias, and may itself be a ground for disqualification even though the
nondisclosed facts or circumstances would not themselves justify disqualifications.
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any evidence. By contrast, Judge Briner was challenged while the case
in question was under final deliberations, after all evidence had been
received, all arguments made, and the full two-week long hearing (the
longest ever at the Tribunal) held. The disruption and expense of sus-
taining this challenge are obvious. Is that a permissible consideration?
The Rules give no explicit answer, permitting challenge whenever cir-
cumstances giving rise to justifiable doubts as to impartiality exist. It must
be the case, however, that the determination of whether such circum-
stances exist and whether the doubts are justifiable must be subject to
greater scrutiny the later in the proceedings the challenge is made.175
A prudent appointing authority may be tempted to sustain an early chal-
lenge simply to be on the safe side and avoid the potential for delay and
disruption later, even though the same circumstances later on would not
justify disqualification. But such an approach would muddle the standard
for arbitrator impartiality-after all, if an arbitrator really is biased he should
be disqualified no matter how late the challenge, and if he is impartial he
should be allowed to serve, no matter how timely the challenge. 176 What
can confidently be stated is that an appointing authority faced with a late
challenge must take particular care to ensure that an allegation of arbitrator
bias is fully justified by concrete and objective evidence before sustaining
the challenge made after hearing the case is completed. 177
175. The General Counsel of the American Arbitration Association has noted that under
AAA practice a challenge made at the outset of a proceeding may "excuse" an arbitrator
if there is any reasonable "appearance that an award might not be fairly rendered." Hoell-
ering, The Experience of the American Arbitration Association in the Selection and Ap-
pointment of Arbitrators, in 6TH JOINT ICC/ICSID/AAA COLLOQUIUM IN INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATION 6 (1988). On the other hand,
[g]iven the serious consequences resulting from the disqualification of an arbitrator
after hearings have commenced, the approach employed by the AAA at this stage
of the process is less liberal-an arbitrator will only be disqualified if the disclosed
information reflects, or a party demonstrates, such an interest on the part of the
arbitrator as would justify judicial vacatur of the arbitral award. In this regard,
the courts have generally held that an arbitration award will not be set aside for
allegations of arbitrator bias unless such bias is adequately proven.
Id.
176. Sustaining an early but unjustified challenge simply to avoid disruption also ignores
the potential effect on the reputation of the arbitrator.
177. As a commentator on the ICC practice has stated:
I would say that the standards of what constitutes a lack of independence do not
differ according to the point at which an allegation of a lack of independence is
raised, but that at the stage of confirmation/appointment Court members are more
ready to take into consideration not only the relative seriousness of the facts
presented but also the desirability of commencing an arbitration on as solid a
footing as possible and of forestalling possible challenges later in the arbitration
when the consequences could be of far greater magnitude.
Bond, The Selection of the Arbitrators: The Experience of the ICC in the Confirmation/
Appointment Stage of an Arbitration, in 6TH JOINT ICC/ICSID/AAA COLLOQUIUM ON
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION (1988).
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Tribunal practice may also shed some light on another compelling ques-
tion: the meaning of impartiality and independence for party-appointed
arbitrators. United States arbitration practice has two approaches to the
neutrality of party-appointed arbitrators. In establishing an arbitration,
parties can agree either that the party-appointed arbitrators will be neutral
or that they will be considered party representatives. 178 In European
practice, by contrast, no such option is available, and no distinction is
made between the impartiality of party-appointed and "neutral" arbitra-
tors. 179 This single standard of impartiality for all arbitrators is reflected
in the UNCITRAL Rules and, at least in theory, at the Tribunal. For
example, care is taken at the Tribunal to refer to the three non-party-
appointed members as "third-country" rather than "neutral" arbitrators,
since all nine arbitrators are required to be "neutral." Both Iranian and
American party-appointed arbitrators have often recused themselves from
cases to avoid the appearance of interest or impartiality 180 and certainly
strict independence is the official stance of the arbitrators and their
governments.
While the United States and Iranian arbitrators most often vote in favor
of nationals of the party that appointed them, they have taken pains in
their separate opinions to demonstrate that their positions are based on
the law and evidence in the record. In countless cases the United States
arbitrators have in fact voted to deny all or part of a claim of a United
States national, just as Iranian judges have on occasion voted to award
all or part of a United States national's claim. 181 Despite occasional crit-
178. See Aksen, supra note 56, at 64; Mosk, The Role of Party-Appointed Arbitrators in
International Arbitration, I TRANSNAT'L LAW. 253, 256-59 (1988); see also AAA RULES,
supra note 21, R.12-.14.
179. See de Vries, International Commercial Arbitration: A Transnational View, I J.
INT'L ARB. 7, 13 (1984); Strauss, The Growing Consensus on International Commercial
Arbitration, 68 AM. J. INT'L L. 709, 714 (1974); see also INT'L CHAMBER COM. ARB. R.
art. 2(4).
180. See Presidential Order No. 19 (Jan. 12, 1984) and Presidential Order No. 21 (Jan.
19, 1984) (reassigning cases following recusals by Judges Shafeiei, Aldrich, and Brower);
Presidential Order No. 57 (Oct. 9, 1987) (accepting Judge Noori's recusal from cases on
which he had previously served as counsel to the Iranian party). Cynical U.S. claimants
have remarked, however, that Iranian recusals seem to occur in cases Iran has an interest
in delaying.
181. E.g., Parguin Private Joint Stock Co. v. United States, Award No. 275-12783-3,
13 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. 261 (1986) (U.S. arbitrator joining award of 3 million rials to Iranian
claimant); Cosmos Eng'g, Inc. v. Ministry of Road & Transp., Award No. 271-334-2, 13
IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. 179 (1986) (Iranian arbitrator joining unanimous award of portion of U.S.
national's claim); H.A. Spaulding, Inc. v. Ministry of Roads & Transp., Award No. 212-
437-3, 10 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. 22 (1986) (U.S. arbitrator joining unanimous award dismissing
claim of U.S. national); Gould Mktg., Inc. v. Iran, Award No. 316-49/50-2, 6 IRAN-U.S.
C.T.R. 131 (U.S. arbitrator joining $2.6 million award to Iranian counterclaimant); Schering
Corp. v. Iran, Award No. 122-38-3, 5 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. 361 (1984) (Iranian arbitrator
forming majority with chairman, over U.S. arbitrator's dissent, for $400,000 award to U.S.
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icism of party-appointed arbitrators for alleged bias, 182 no party-
appointed arbitrator has ever been challenged for partiality.
On the other hand, acceptance of something like a predisposition on
the part of an arbitrator toward the appointing party is simply an ac-
knowledgment of reality. Party-appointed arbitrators are more often in a
position more readily to appreciate and to explain to the other arbitrators
the legal theories, cultural assumptions, and general approach of the party
that appointed them. This fact does not demonstrate bias towards one
side or another; it is a natural and useful function of the three-member
panel and the appointing process. ' 83
3. Failure or Inability to Act
Article 13 of the UNCITRAL Rules provides that the challenge pro-
cedure may also apply if an arbitrator fails to act or if it becomes de jure
or de facto impossible for him to perform his functions. 184 A challengeable
failure to act could arise if an arbitrator refuses to participate in the arbitral
proceedings but also refuses to resign. 185 Because respondents are usually
benefited by delay, the failure of the respondent's appointed arbitrator to
participate in Tribunal deliberations without legitimate reason can also
be challenged as evidence of lack of impartiality. Either party to the
arbitration may then challenge such an arbitrator. 186 If the other party
does not agree or the arbitrator does not withdraw, the appointing au-
thority decides whether the arbitrator's nonparticipation constitutes a
failure to act under the UNCITRAL Rules. 187 A prolonged refusal to
participate should also lead to a successful challenge on the ground that
the arbitrator has failed to act. Iranian arbitrators have on occasion refused
to participate in Tribunal deliberations, but none has been challenged on
claimant); Iran v. United States, Award No. 33-A-4/A-15-2, 5 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. 131 (1984)
(unanimous decision restraining United States from selling items in U.S. Iranian embassy);
Haji-Bagherpour v. United States, Award No. 23-428-2, 2 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. 38 (1983)
(Iranian arbitrator joining unanimous award dismissing claim of Iranian national).
182. Letter of Aug. 8, 1983 from Judge Shafeiei to Judge Lagergren, complaining that
American arbitrators wished "to convert the Tribunal into a machine for churning out awards
against Iran," appended to Dr. Shafeiei's reasons for not signing awards, supra note 131, 3
IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. at 129.
183. See Mosk, supra note 178, at 261-63; see also Comment of Mr. Holtzmann in Eighth
Session Record, supra note 1, SR.162, at 132-33 (third-country arbitrator "learn[s] a great
deal about the customs and traditions in the countries of the two parties, as a result of
hearing the two other [party-appointed] arbitrators"); Comment of Prof. Sanders in Com-
mittee of the Whole 1I Summary, supra note 1, SR.3, at 2 (same).
184. UNCITRAL RULES art. 13(2); see infra note 213 (text of rule). This provision is
discussed at greater length below.
185. See also Franco-Tunisian Arbitration, [1957] INT'L L. REP. 767, 769, quoted in M.
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this ground. Rather, the Tribunal has dealt with an arbitrator's nonpar-
ticipation by proceeding to an award with only two arbitrators, thus pre-
venting the action of an unwilling arbitrator from impeding progress on
a case. 1
8 8
B. CHALLENGE PROCEDURE (ARTICLES 11-12)
1. Method and Consequences
In theory, a party may challenge any arbitrator. A party, however, may
challenge his own party-appointed arbitrator only for reasons of which
he first becomes aware after the appointment has been made.' 89 Under
article 11 of the UNCITRAL Rules' 9° a challenging party must send
written notice of the challenge to the challenged arbitrator, the other party,
and the other members of the tribunal, stating the reasons for the chal-
lenge. 19 1 The challenging party must make the challenge within fifteen
days after it has received notice of the appointment 92 or within fifteen
days after the party first learns of the circumstances giving rise to justi-
fiable doubts about the arbitrator's impartiality or independence. 1
93
188. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 131.
189. UNCITRAL RULES art. 10(2). The claimants and respondents in cases before the
Tribunal may challenge an arbitrator only on the basis of circumstances related to the
particular case involved. The two governments may challenge an arbitrator upon general
grounds which relate to several cases. See TRIBUNAL RULES, supra note 6, note I accom-
panying arts. 9-12.
190. UNCITRAL RULES art. II reads as follows:
1. A party who intends to challenge an arbitrator shall send notice of his challenge
within fifteen days after the appointment of the challenged arbitrator has been
notified to the challenging party or within fifteen days after the circumstances
mentioned in articles 9 and 10 became known to that party.
2. The challenge shall be notified to the other party, to the arbitrator who is chal-
lenged and to the other members of the arbitral tribunal. The notification shall
be in writing and shall state the reasons for the challenge.
3. When an arbitrator has been challenged by one party, the other party may agree
to the challenge. The arbitrator may also, after the challenge, withdraw from his
office. In neither case does this imply acceptance of the validity of the grounds
for the challenge. In both cases the procedure provided in article 6 or 7 shall be
used in full for the appointment of the substitute arbitrator, even if during the
process of appointing the challenged arbitrator a party had failed to exercise his
right to appoint or to participate in the appointment.
191. Id. art. 11(2).
192. Under the Tribunal Rules the period of fifteen days starts to run for the claimant(s)
and respondent(s) in a particular case after the challenging party has been given notice of
the Chamber to which the case has been assigned. If the case is relinquished to the Full
Tribunal, the period for challenging an arbitrator who is not a member of the relinquishing
Chamber starts to run after the challenging party is given notice of the relinquishment. See
TRIBUNAL RULES, supra note 6, note 2 to arts. 9-12.
193. UNCITRAL RULES art. I I(])
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The fifteen-day requirement has two obvious purposes-first, to prevent
a party from "saving" a challenge until it gets an impression, perhaps
late in the proceeding, of the ultimate outcome of the case and, second,
to avoid late challenges calculated to cause disruption and expense. 194
The rule makes good sense, but raises two corollary issues which the
Rules do not specifically address.
One is whether a party has duty to investigate an arbitrator's back-
ground at the outset of the arbitration in order to uncover any accessible
and public information that could serve as the basis of a challenge to the
arbitrator. In other words, is it the challenging party's actual subjective
knowledge that governs, or is it instead an objective standard, requiring
a challenge within fifteen days of when the party "knew or should have
known" of the circumstance? Iran's challenge of Judge Briner in Septem-
ber 1988 raised the question whether Iran had a duty to investigate Judge
Briner's activities and professional relationships upon his appointment.
This issue was particularly significant in that challenge because Judge
Briner's professional relationship, on which the challenge was based, was
published in an annual listing of all directorships of Swiss companies, so
that Iran could have learned of that relationship long before the challenge
was made.
A related issue arising from the fifteen-day rule is whether and how the
challenging party must prove that it first obtained knowledge of the cir-
cumstance within fifteen days of bringing the challenge. Given the public
nature of the relationship that led to the Briner challenge, questions arose
in that case about whether Iran had actual knowledge of the relationship
more than fifteen days before it brought the challenge.
The Rules provide no explicit guidance as to these issues. Read literally,
article 11 does not impose any duty of investigation upon appointment,
and the fifteen-day period starts when the party actually first knows of
the circumstances-there is no concept of constructive knowledge or
"should have known" objectivity. On the other hand, the more notorious
or publicly available the information, the higher would be the expectation
that a party would reasonably have been aware of it. This would in turn
increase the challenging party's burden to prove that it in fact did not
have actual knowledge until the challenge was made. The purposes of the
rule suggest as well that the later in the proceedings a challenge is made,
194. See Committee of the Whole 11 Summary, supra note I, SR.3, at 4. At one point
the UNCITRAL delegates considered expanding the time-limit to 30 days, but retained the
shorter period, to "avoid the possibility of a party awaiting the completion of the arbitration
procedure before making the challenge." Id.; Committee of the Whole 1I Report, supra note
1, at 173.
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the more convincing must be the challenger's proof that it first gained
knowledge of the circumstances with the fifteen-day period. At the very
least, a party should be expected to disclose fully the circumstances
leading to its belated challenge. The mere declaration that it had "just
learned" of the basis for the challenge should not be enough.
A related question is whether the fifteen-day time limit is jurisdictional,
or whether it can be waived by the appointing authority. 195 The rule as
written seems to leave no room for extensions or waiver of the fifteen-
day period by the appointing authority. The travaux described the effect
of the rule as a loss of the right to challenge, which "takes place auto-
matically when no challenge is made within the 15 days."' 19 6 In applying
the corresponding Tribunal rule, President Boeckstiegel refused a request
by Iran for a two-month extension of time within which to bring a possible
challenge to Judge Virally as to a particular case, stating that in view of
the fifteen-day time limit there was "no room for extensions." 197 This
would appear to support a view of the time limit as absolute and nonex-
tendable, except that President Boeckstiegel had already permitted the
parties much more than fifteen days. Judge Virally's disclosure statement
containing the professional relationships in question was made available
to the Iranian agent no later than May 22, 1985, but President Boeckstiegel
stated that he would accept comments or objections until June 28, 1985.198
Because no challenge was ultimately made, the issue whether the fifteen-
day limit is jurisdictional and nonextendable was never specifically ad-
dressed, but President Boeckstiegel's action suggests that he at least be-
lieved the fifteen-day limit could be extended in proper circumstances.
The consequences of a challenge are stated in articles 11(3) and 12.199
The arbitrator will be replaced if either the other party agrees to the
195. The other party clearly can waive the time limit, since by agreement of the parties
any provision of the rules can be modified. See article 1(1) (modification by agreement) and
article 30 (waiver of the rules).
196. Report Preliminary Draft, supra note 1, at 171; Report Revised Draft, supra note
1, at 170.
197. Letter of Mr. Eshragh to President Boeckstiegel, in Case No. 74, filed June 25, 1985;
letter of President Boeckstiegel to Mr. Eshragh in Case 74 (et al.), filed July 12, 1985.
198. Letter of President Boeckstiegel to Agents of Iran and the United States in Case
No. 74, filed May 22, 1985.
199. Under UNCITRAL RULES art. 12:
1. If the other party does not agree to the challenge and the challenged ar-
bitrator does not withdraw, the decision on the challenge will be made:
(a) When the initial appointment was made by an appointing authority,
by that authority;
(b) When the initial appointment was not made by an appointing authority,
but an appointing authority has been previously designated, by that
authority;
(c) In all other cases, by the appointing authority to be designated in accor-
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challenge or the arbitrator himself withdraws from his office. Article 11(3)
specifies that neither action implies acceptance of the validity of the
grounds. In either case the procedure provided for the appointment of
the challenged arbitrator will be used "in full" for the appointment of the
new arbitrator, even if during the process of appointing the challenged
arbitrator a party failed to exercise his rights to appoint or to participate
in the appointment. 2° °
The provisions of article 6 governing arbitrator appointment are thus
incorporated into the challenge procedures. But as noted above, article
6 contains certain ambiguities that may be relevant here as well. For
example, suppose that the challenged arbitrator was the sole arbitrator
appointed by an appointing authority which itself was designated by the
Secretary-General of the Permanent Court. In finding a replacement the
parties must first try to reach an agreement on the choice of a new ar-
bitrator and an appointing authority within thirty days. If they fail on both
counts, either party may request the Secretary-General of the Permanent
Court to designate an appointing authority, which will appoint the new
sole arbitrator. The rule does not seem to permit the parties to make a
request immediately to the appointing authority previously designated by
the Secretary-General, although presumably a "continuing designation"
would eliminate the need for the parties to request a second designation. 20 1
If the other party does not accept the challenge and the challenged
arbitrator does not withdraw from his office, article 12 specifies that the
decision on the challenge will be made by an appointing authority.202 If
an appointing authority is already in place, whether agreed upon or des-
ignated by the Secretary-General of the Permanent Court, that authority
will make the decision. 20 3 If no appointing authority has yet been des-
ignated, an appointing authority must be designated "in accordance with
the procedure for designating an appointing authority as provided for in
dance with the procedure for designating an appointing authority as pro-
vided for in article 6.
2. If the appointing authority sustains the challenge, a substitute arbitrator
shall be appointed or chosen pursuant to the procedure applicable to the
appointment or choice of an arbitrator as provided in articles 6 to 9 except
that, when this procedure would call for the designation of an appointing
authority, the appointment of the arbitrator shall be made by the appointing
authority which decided on the challenge.
200. Id. art. 11(3).
201. See supra text accompanying notes 63-65.
202. UNCITRAL RuLEs art. 12(1).
203. UNCITRAL RULEs art. 12(l)(a), (b). During the discussions of the UNCITRAL
Commission, there was some resistance against having the appointing authority who ap-
pointed the challenged arbitrator make the decision on his challenge. See Report Discussion
Preliminary Draft, supra note 1, at 62.
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Article 6."204 If the appointing authority sustains the challenge, the new
arbitrator is to be appointed following the same procedure applicable to
the appointment of the challenged arbitrator, except that, when that pro-
cedure calls for selection by an appointing authority, the appointment will
be made by the appointing authority that decided the challenge. 20 5
2. Challenge of Judge Mangdrd
On January 1, 1982, even before the Tribunal began hearing cases, Iran
demanded that Judge Mangard be removed from the Tribunal because he
allegedly made derogatory remarks about the judicial system in Iran.20 6
Judge Mangard did not withdraw, and the United States did not agree to
the challenge. 207 At the United States' request, the Secretary-General of
the Permanent Court designated Chief Justice Moons as appointing au-
thority to decide the challenge. 20 8 In his opinion released on March 5,
1982, Chief Justice Moons decided several important issues.
Iran contended that the Secretary-General was not empowered to des-
ignate an appointing authority until the parties attempted and failed to
reach an agreement on the selection of an appointing authority. 209 Chief
Justice Moons rejected this argument. According to the Chief Justice, the
clear intention of article 12 is to ensure a speedy decision on the challenge.
In light of this concern, it must be assumed that article 12(1)(c) allows
designation of an appointing authority as quickly and simply as possible,
just as in article 12(l)(a) and (b). Therefore, the provision in article 12(l)(c)
to the effect that the designation of an appointing authority must be "in
accordance with the procedure for designating an appointing authority as
provided for in Article 6," must be interpreted to allow either party to
request the Secretary-General to designate an appointing authority with-
out first seeking agreement from the other party. According to Chief
Justice Moons the travauxprodparatoires of the UNCITRAL Rules support
204. UNCITRAL RULES art. 12(l)(c).
205. Id. art. 12(I)(a). The changes proposed above at note 65 in relation to articles 6 and
7 of the UNCITRAL Rules would allow some streamlining of article 12. If no appointing
authority has yet been designated, either party may immediately request the Secretary-
General of the Permanent Court of Arbitration to designate an appointing authority. In our
proposed articles 6 and 7 it would be stated that the appointing authority serves for all
purposes. It would not be necessary to mention further in article 12(2) that the appointment
will be made by the appointing authority "who decided on the challenge." Overall, our
proposal would tip the balance between the goals of party agreement and speedy arbitration
even more in the direction of the latter.
206. Re Judge N. Mangard, I IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. 509, 515 (1982).
207. Id. at 509.
208. Id.; see 1983 IRAN-U.S. CLAIMS TRIBUNAL ANN. REP. 4 & n.2.
209. Re Judge N. Mangard, I IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. 509, 513-14 (1982).
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this interpretation because article 6 allows no opportunity to seek agree-
ment on the choice of an appointing authority.210
Chief Justice Moons's interpretation of the language of the rule and of
the travaux may be questioned, but the end result is certainly proper.
Contrary to Chief Justice Moons' suggestion, the UNCITRAL Commis-
sion did not delete the opportunity for an agreement on an appointing
authority under article 6, but merged both periods given for agreement
on an arbitrator and an appointing authority to one time period of thirty
days. The UNCITRAL Rules could, however, probably be modified to
reflect Chief Justice Moons's interpretation. The parties have the oppor-
tunity to negotiate on an appointing authority when writing the arbitration
clause or at the start of the arbitration. If they fail to choose an appointing
authority then, they should not be required to try again in the event of a
challenge. The parties are unlikely to agree on an appointing authority in
the tense atmosphere of a challenge if they were unable to agree at the
start of the arbitration. Of course, the parties would still have the option
of agreeing, if they wish, and their choice of an appointing authority would
prevail over an appointing authority designated by the Secretary-General.
Chief Justice Moons ultimately ruled that Iran's challenge was inadmis-
sible. According the Chief Justice Moons, objections to a duly appointed
arbitrator are admissible only if: (a) the party intends to use the legal rem-
edy of a challenge as provided in the UNCITRAL Rules; and (b) the reg-
ulations set forth in article 11 of the Rules have been observed. 211 The Chief
Justice determined that Iran had satisfied neither requirement because its
submission did not clearly state the circumstances or actual events that
allegedly gave rise to disqualification. Iran had not sufficiently stated a
"reason for the challenge" as required by article 11.212
C. REPLACEMENT OF AN ARBITRATOR (ARTICLE 13)
Article 13 of the UNCITRAL Rules213 deals with four situations in-
volving the replacement of an arbitrator in addition to replacement after
210. Id. at 514.
211. Re Judge N. Mangard, I IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. at 517.
212. Id.
213. UNCITRAL RULES art. 13 provides that:
I. In the event of the death or resignation of an arbitrator during the course
of the arbitral proceedings, a substitute arbitrator shall be appointed or
chosen pursuant to the procedure provided for in articles 6 to 9 that was
applicable to the appointment or choice of the arbitrator being replaced.
2. In the event that an arbitrator fails to act or in the event of the de jure or
de facto impossibility of his performing his functions, the procedure in
respect of the challenge and replacement of an arbitrator as provided in the
preceding articles shall apply.
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challenge. The first two scenarios involve the death or resignation of an
arbitrator during the course of arbitral proceedings. The other two are
the failure to act and the de jure or de facto impossibility of performing
the function of arbitrator. Under article 13, a new arbitrator will be ap-
pointed or chosen in accordance with the procedure applicable for the
appointment or choice of the arbitrator being replaced.
1. Resignation
Twelve arbitrators have resigned from the Iran-United States Claims
Tribunal. 2 14 In early 1982 Iranian arbitrator Enayat resigned to protest
Judge Mangard's refusal to resign. 2 15 In 1983 Judge Bellet and Judge Sani
resigned, and in 1984 Judge Mosk and President Lagergren stepped
down. 2 16 Judges Riphagen and Mangard left the Tribunal in early 1985;
Judges Mostafavi and Bahrami in 1987.217 Judge Brower left in March
1988; and Judges Virally and Boeckstiegel resigned effective December
1988.218
Concerns have been raised about how to avoid disrupting the arbitral
proceedings when an arbitrator resigns. This concern is emphasized by
the Government of Iran's announcement of Judge Sani's resignation. The
United States protested sharply when Judge Sani resigned by tendering
his resignation to his government and then departing. 2 19 In essence, the
United States argued that a party-appointed arbitrator cannot arrange his
resignation with the party that appointed him, especially when his de-
parture would incapacitate the Full Tribunal a few days before a scheduled
meeting. 220 At a Full Tribunal meeting on September 5, 1983, the Tribunal
agreed, deciding that a party-appointed arbitrator must present his res-
214. Two others, Judges Shafeiei and Kashani, were withdrawn by their government after
they were challenged.
215. Iranian Quits Tribunal to Protest Mangard's Refusal to Resign, IALR 4,234. (Feb.
19, 1982).
216. Dutch International Law Expert Named to Replace Bellet, IALR 6,849 (July 15,
1983); Sani Resigns, Raising Questions Over Future of Chamber Proceedings, IALR 7,037
(Aug. 19, 1983); Mosk to Be Replaced by Brower in January, IALR 7,602 (Dec. 16, 1983);
Lagergren Tells Tribunal He Will Stay on Until Next September, IALR 8,372 (May 11, 1984).
217. Riphagen Resigns for Health Reasons, Will Not Hear Any More Cases, IALR 9,847
(Dec. 28, 1984); Mangard Resigns, Citing Approach of 70th Birthday, IALR 9,919 (Jan. 1I,
1985); Tribunal Notes: Mostafavi Resignation Accepted by Full Tribunal, 2 MEALY'S 305
(Apr. 17, 1987); Bahrami Resignation Accepted, Replacement Named, 2 MEALY'S 1,594-
95 (Dec. 18, 1987).
218. Richard Allison Will Replace Charles Brower, 2 MEALY'S 1,421 (Nov. 20, 1987);
Boeckstiegel and Virally Resignations Accepted by Tribunal, 3 MEALY'S No. II, at 3 (July
8, 1988).
219. Letter of Agent of the United States, John R. Crook, to Judge Lagergren of Aug.
16, 1983, IALR 7,105 (Sept. 2, 1983) [hereinafter Letter].
220. Id. at 7,105-07.
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ignation to the Tribunal itself, not to the government that appointed him. 221
Moreover, the Tribunal decided that it would not accept Judge Sani's
resignation until his replacement was available to take up his duties. 222
This scenario was repeated in 1987 when Judge Mostafavi resigned and
left The Hague although Iran had not named a replacement, but the two
governments were able to agree to the temporary seating of an ad hoc
arbitrator to hear most of the cases scheduled until a permanent replace-
ment was named. 223
The potential disruption caused by resignation was again highlighted
when Judge Lagergren announced his resignation effective October 1,
1984. Iran initially resisted discussions leading to a replacement, arguing
that the time period for naming a replacement could begin to run only
after his actual resignation. 224 Chief Justice Moons correctly rejected this
interpretation, which had it been allowed, would have disrupted the work
of Chamber One, possibly for several months. Such an interpretation of
the UNCITRAL Rules is unacceptable in the context of the Tribunal,
which has been charged with adjudicating thousands of individual claims
over several years. Even in the case of an arbitration panel set up to hear
a single case, an unforeseen resignation can stall the arbitral process and
cost the parties valuable time and money. The Tribunal's interpretation
of how and when a resignation takes effect under article 13 is compelling
on policy grounds and should be applied by other arbitrators using the
rules. 225
Another method the Tribunal adopted to minimize disruption is its
amendment to article 13, which provides that a resigning arbitrator will
continue to deliberate and sign the award in any case for which he was
present at the hearing on the merits. 226 Application of this provision,
known as the "Mosk rule" (for Judge Mosk, the first judge to whom it
was applied), in effect means that an arbitrator's resignation is for future
cases, not for those cases already heard. The American and "third-
221. Iran Appoints Arbitrator to Replace Sani, IALR 7,155 (Sept. 16, 1983).
222. Sherman & Stewart, supra note 4, at 14. This argument raises the interesting issues
of whether the Tribunal can refuse such a resignation and, if so, for how long?
223. See Presidential Orders 52 and 54 (Apr. 3 and 14, 1987).
224. Moons Gives Arbitrators Until September 1 to Decide on Lagergren Successor, IALR
8,744-45 (July 13, 1984).
225. While an eventual effort to revise the UNCITRAL Rules may wish to consider
imposing more explicit notice of resignation requirements as well as deadlines for the re-
placement of a resigning arbitrator, the Rule as interpreted by the Tribunal adequately
protects the integrity of the arbitral process upon an arbitrator's resignation. See Uiterwyk
Corp. v. Iran, Award No. 375-381-1, para. 30, 19 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. -(1988), 3
MEALY'S No. 14, § A, at 8-9 (July 22, 1988).
226. TRIBUNAL RULES, supra note 6, art. 13(5).
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country" arbitrators have generally fulfilled their responsibilities under
this rule, while Iranian arbitrators sometimes have not. 227
The "Mosk rule" provides a common sense rule of thumb for a resigning
arbitrator in a multi-case arbitration. Although the Tribunal cannot real-
istically force an arbitrator who wishes to resign to continue deliberations
in cases that may take many months or years to resolve, existence of an
obligation to continue should discourage tactical resignations by a party-
appointed arbitrator. This rule provides the tribunal with an explicit basis
on which to complete its deliberations on a case without such an arbitrator
if it so chooses. 228 In a normal, single-case arbitration, the "Mosk rule"
would not be appropriate, however, since it would in effect prohibit res-
ignation after a hearing, a situation the Rules expressly address. 229
2. Failure or Impossibility to Act
The other grounds for replacement are failure to act and the de jure or
de facto impossibility of acting. 230 What is a "failure to act"? Not signing
an award should not be considered a failure to act, because article 32(4)
of the UNCITRAL Rules states explicitly what happens if an arbitrator
refuses to sign an award. 23 1 A more difficult issue arises when an arbitrator
227. Compare Sedco, Inc. v. Nat'l Iranian Oil Co., Award No. 309-129-3, 15 IRAN-U.S.
C.T.R. 23 (1987) (Judge Mangard continuing after his resignation); Harris Int'l Telecom.,
Inc. v. Iran, Award No. 323-409-1, 17 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. 31 (1987) (Judge Mostafavi con-
tinuing after his resignation); William L. Pereira Assocs. v. Iran, Award No. 116-1-3, 5
IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. 198 (1984) (Judge Mosk continuing after his resignation); see also cases
cited supra note 131 (Judge Sani refusing to sign awards after his resignation); Uiterwyk
Corp. v. Iran, Award No. 375-381-1, 19 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. - (1988), 3 MEALY'S No.
12, § A (July 22, 1988) (Judge Mostafavi refusing to sign award after his resignation); Schering
Corp. v. Iran, Award No. 122-38-3, 5 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. 361, 3 (1984) (Judge Mosk con-
tinuing after his resignation and Judge Sani refusing to participate after his resignation);
IALR 9,506 (Oct. 26, 1984) (Mosk rule not applied to Shafeiei and Kashani).
228. See Supplemental Opinion of Mr. Boeckstiegel and Mr. Holtzmann in Uiterwyk
Corp. v. Iran, Award No. 375-381-1, 19 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. -(1988), 3 MEALY'S No.
14, § A, at 45, 46-47.
229. UNCITRAL RULES art. 14.
230. Id. art. 13(2).
231. Id. art. 32(4) (if an arbitrator fails to sign, the award "shall state the reason for the
absence of the signature"). The Tribunal's practice has been not to consider failure to sign
as failure to act under article 13. See "refusing to sign" cases, supra note 131; see also
Uiterwyk Corp. v. Iran, Award No. 375-381-1, 19 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. - (1988), 3
MEALY'S No. 12, § A, at 3 (July 22, 1988); Starrett Hous. v. Iran, Award No. 314-24-1,
16 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. 112 (1987); SEDCO, Inc. v. Nat'l Iranian Oil Co., Award No. 310-
129-3, 15 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. 23 (1987); Saghi v. Iran, Award No. 66-298-2, 14 IRAN-U.S.
C.T.R. 3 (1987); American Int'l Group v. Iran, Award No. 93-2-3, 4 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. 96
(1983); Charles T. Main Int'l, Inc. v. Khuzestan Water, Award No. ITL 23-120-2, 3 IRAN-
U.S. C.T.R. 156 (1983); Craig v. Ministry of Energy, Award No. 71-346-3, 3 IRAN-U.S.
C.T.R. 280 (1983); John Carl Warnecke & Assoc. v. Bank Mellat, Award No. 72-124-3, 3
IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. 256 (1983); Woodward-Clyde Consultants v. Iran, Award No. 73-67-3,
3 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. 239 (1983); Blount Bros. Corp. v. Ministry of Hous., Award No. 74-
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does not participate in the deliberations for some period of time. 232 How
long must parties and arbitrators wait before the delinquent arbitrator is
demonstrably failing to act? In the meantime, can the other arbitrators
go ahead without one arbitrator being present? In the Tribunal, when
Iranian arbitrators made themselves unavailable for deliberations, their
Chambers generally continued deliberations and issued awards without
them, although occasionally schedules were modified to accommodate the
Iranian arbitrator, potentially causing inconvenience and increasing the
cost to the affected parties. 233
The Tribunal practice of continuing proceedings despite an arbitrator's
absence will sometimes be necessary to avoid disruption at the hands of
partisan arbitrators. The UNCITRAL Rules must be interpreted so as to
allow arbitral proceedings to continue despite tactical absences on the
part of an arbitrator. Certainly, a deliberate absence is a "failure to act"
and grounds for removal, but as the Tribunal's experience shows, this is
not the exclusive remedy-the Tribunal can go forward without the absent
arbitrator. Only in the event of involuntary nonparticipation of an arbi-
trator (for example, because of illness) should proceedings be sus-
pended. 234 Of course, a prolonged impossibility to perform the function
62-3, 3 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. 225 (1983); Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. Bank Markazi Iran, Award
No. 46-57-2, 2 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. 334 (1983); Esphahanian v. Bank Tejarat, Award No. 31-
157-2, 2 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. 157 (1983); Golpira v. Iran, Award No. 32-211-2, 2 IRAN-U.S.
C.T.R. 171 (1983); Haroonian v. Iran, Award No. 33-418-2, 2 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. 226 (1983)
(Shafeiei refusing to sign Farsi text).
232. See K. CARLSTON, THE PROCESS OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 12 (1946); R.
M. Mosk, Additional Comments Concerning the Reasons for Absence of Signature, in Craig
v. Ministry of Energy, Award No. 71-346-3, 3 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. 294 (1983) (discussing
authorities in favor of continuation of arbitral proceedings); Letter, supra note 219, at 7,105.
233. See Tribunal Postpones Plenary Hearings, IALR 7,098 (Sept. 2, 1983); Iran Appoints
Arbitrator to Replace Sani, IALR 7,155-56 (Sept. 16, 1983).
234. In adapting UNCITRAL Rule 13, the Tribunal added to the Rule a provision as
follows:
2 .... In applying the provisions of this paragraph, if the President, after
consultation with the other members of the Full Tribunal, determines that
the failure of a member to act or his impossibility to perform his functions
is due to a temporary illness or other circumstances expected to be of
relatively short duration, the member shall not be replaced but a substitute
member shall be appointed for the temporary period in accordance with the
same procedures as are described in Note 5 to Articles 9-12.
4. A substitute member appointed for a temporary period shall continue to
serve with respect to any case in which he has participated in the hearing,
notwithstanding the member for whom he is a substitute is again available
and may work on other Tribunal cases and matters.
This provision for temporary absence was invoked, not without controversy, in early 1978
when Judge Brower temporarily left the Tribunal to serve as Deputy Special Counsellor to
President Reagan with responsibility for initial investigations of the Iran-Contra affair. During
Judge Brower's absence, Carl F. Salans, previously appointed by the United States to serve
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of arbitrator, even if outside the control of the arbitrator, should also be
grounds for replacement.
D. REPETITION OF HEARINGS (ARTICLE 14)
Pursuant to article 14 of the UNCITRAL Rules, any hearings held prior
to the replacement of a sole or presiding arbitrator must be repeated. 235
If any other arbitrator is replaced, however, prior hearings need not be
repeated at the discretion of the arbitral tribunal. The Tribunal altered
this rule so that the arbitral tribunal (either the Full Tribunal or a three-
judge Chamber, depending on the situation) may use its discretion in
deciding whether to repeat all or any part of the previous hearings, re-
gardless of the status of the arbitrator who is permanently or temporarily
replaced. 236 While the "Mosk rule" should mean that repetition of hear-
ings will not occur after an arbitrator's voluntary resignation, some ar-
bitrators have refused to continue to participate in deliberations following
their resignation. 237 In such a situation the Chamber involved occasionally
ordered a new hearing, 238 but this action is rare; generally no new hearing
has been held. 239
IV. Summary
The UNCITRAL Rules 1 through 14, which govern the largely prelim-
inary issues of establishment of the arbitration, choice of the arbitrators,
procedure for challenge, and related matters, have undergone rigorous
testing in the Tribunal. Although the Rules could be clarified or improved
in a number of areas in light of Tribunal experience, the UNCITRAL
as substitute member of the Tribunal, served as Judge Brower's replacement in several
cases. See Presidential Orders 51 and 53 (Feb. 2, 1987, and Apr. 8, 1987), 14 IRAN-U.S.
C.T.R. 353-54. Under TRIBUNAL RULES, supra note 6, art. 13(4), Judge Salans continued
to serve on all cases which he heard as Judge Brower's substitute, even after Judge Brower
returned to the Tribunal. See Tribunal Notes, 2 MEALY'S 306-07 (Apr. 17, 1987).
235. UNCITRAL RULES art. 14 reads as follows: "If under articles I I to 13 the sole or
presiding arbitrator is replaced, any hearings held previously shall be repeated; if any other
arbitrator is replaced, such prior hearings may be repeated at the discretion of the arbitral
tribunal."
236. TRIBUNAL RULES, supra note 6, art. 14.
237. See supra note 227.
238. See, e.g., Order of October 24, 1983, in R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Iran, Case
No. 35, 4 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. 2 (1983) (rescheduling hearing after resignation of Iranian
arbitrator).
239. See, e.g., Ultrasystems, Inc. v. Iran, Award No. 89-84-3, 4 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. 77
(1983); Dames & Moore v. Iran, Award No. 97-54-3, 4 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. 212 (1983);
American Int'l Group v. Iran, Award No. 93-2-3, 4 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. 96, 98 (1983); Scher-
ing Corp. v. Iran, Award No. 122-38-3, 5 IRAN-U.S. C.T.R. 361, 362 (1984) (noting that
no rehearing was held despite the resignation of the Iranian arbitrator).
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Rules have generally shown themselves capable of practical and effective
implementation. The variety and importance of the issues arising in the
Iran-United States Claims Tribunal and the satisfactory resolution of those
issues under the rubric of the Rules bolsters confidence in the stability
and adaptability of the Rules in the real world of international commercial
arbitration.
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